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Abstract: 
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   1 Introduction
Spurred by the success of Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954) Life Cycle model and
Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis, a vast literature in the 1960s and
1970s formalized the idea that household spending can be modeled as reﬂecting op-
timal intertemporal choice. Famous papers by Schectman and Escudero (1977)a n d
Bewley (1977) capped this literature, providing the foundation for the ascendancy
of dynamic stochastic optimizing models in economics.
Given this pedigree, it is surprising that the now-standard method for analyzing
such problems, contraction mapping theory, has not yet been used to establish
some basic properties of the benchmark consumption problem with unbounded (e.g.
constant relative risk aversion) utility, uncertain noncapital income, and no liquidity
constraints (nor has any other method established such results). The gap exists
because standard theorems from the contraction mapping literature (those in Stokey
et. al. (1989)) cannot be used for this problem (for reasons explained below).
This paper ﬁlls that gap, deriving the conditions that must be satisﬁed for the
problem to have a nondegenerate solution.
The reader could be forgiven for not having noticed a gap. A large literature
solving precisely these kinds of problems has emerged over the past two decades
(following Zeldes (1989)), fueled by advances in numerical solution methods. But
numerical solutions are a ‘black box:’ They make it possible to use a model without
really understanding it. Indeed, without foundational theory, it can be diﬃcult even
to be sure that a computational solution is correct, given the notorious diﬃculty of
writing error-free computer code. Furthermore, without theoretical underpinnings,
the analyst often has little intuition for how results might change with the structure
or calibration of the model.
For example, numerical solutions typically imply the existence of a target level
of nonhuman wealth (‘cash’ for short) such that if cash exceeds the target, the
consumer will spend freely and cash will fall (in expectation), while if cash is below
the target the consumer will save and cash will rise. Carroll (1992; 1997) showed that
target saving behavior can arise under plausible parameter values for both inﬁnite
and ﬁnite horizon models. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate the model using
household data and conclude that for the mean household the buﬀer-stock phase of
life lasts from age 25 until around age 40-45; using the same model with diﬀerent data
Cagetti (2003) ﬁnds target saving behavior into the 50s for the median household.
But none of these papers provides a rigorous delineation of the circumstances under
which target saving will emerge or an analytical explantion for why such behavior
is optimal.
This paper provides the analytical foundations for target saving and many other
results that have become familiar from the numerical literature. All theoretical
conclusions are paired with numerically computed illustrations (using software avail-
2able on the author’s website), providing an integrated framework for understanding
buﬀer-stock saving.
The paper proceeds in three parts.
The ﬁrst part speciﬁes the conditions required for the problem to deﬁne a unique
limiting consumption function. The conditions turn out to strongly resemble those
required for the liquidity constrained perfect foresight model to have a solution;
that parallel is explored and explained. Next, some limiting properties are derived
for the consumption function as cash approaches inﬁnity and as it approaches its
lower bound, and the theorem asserting that the problem deﬁnes a contraction
mapping is proven. Finally, a related class of commonly-used models (exempliﬁed
by Deaton (1991)) is shown to constitute a particular limit of this paper’s more
general model.
The next section examines ﬁve key properties of the model. First, as cash
approaches inﬁnity the expected growth rate of consumption and the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) converge to their values in the perfect foresight
case. Second, as cash approaches zero the expected growth rate of consumption
approaches inﬁnity, and the MPC approaches a simple analytical limit. Third,
if the consumer is suﬃciently ‘impatient’ (in a particular sense), a unique target
cash-to-permanent-income ratio will exist. Fourth, at the target cash ratio, the
expected growth rate of consumption is slightly less than the expected growth rate
of permanent noncapital income. Finally, the expected growth rate of consumption
is declining in the level of cash. The ﬁrst four propositions are proven under general
assumptions about parameter values; the last is shown to hold if there are no
transitory shocks, but may fail in extreme cases if there are both transitory and
permanent shocks.
Szeidl (2006) has recently proven that such an economy will be characterized
by stable invariant distributions for the consumption ratio, the wealth ratio, and
other variables.
1 Using Szeidl’s result, the ﬁnal section shows that even with a
ﬁxed aggregate interest rate that diﬀers from the time preference rate, an economy
populated by buﬀer stock consumers converges to a balanced growth equilibrium
in which the growth rate of aggregate consumption tends toward the (exogenous)
growth rate of aggregate permanent income. A similar proposition holds at the level
of individual households.
1Szeidl’s proof supplants the analysis in an earlier draft of this paper, which conjectured that such a result held
and provided supportive simulation evidence.
32 The Problem
2.1 Setup
The consumer solves an optimization problem from the current period t until the
end of life at T deﬁned by the objective
max Et
 
T−t  
n=0
β
nu(c c ct+n)
 
(1)
where u(•)=•1−ρ/(1 − ρ) is a constant relative risk aversion utility function with
ρ>1.
2,3 The consumer’s initial condition is deﬁned by market resources m m mt (what
Deaton (1991) calls ‘cash-on-hand’) and permanent noncapital income p p pt. (This will
henceforth be called a ‘Friedman/Buﬀer Stock’ (FBS) income process because its
deﬁnition corresponds reasonably well to the descriptions in Friedman (1957)a n d
because such a process has been widely used in the numerical buﬀer stock saving
literature.)
In the usual treatment, a dynamic budget constraint (DBC) simultaneously in-
corporates all of the elements that determine next period’s m m m given this period’s
choices; but for the detailed analysis here, it will be useful to disarticulate the steps.
Thus, we capture the individual ingredients of the DBC as follows:
a a at = m m mt −c c ct (2)
b b bt+1 = a a atR
p p pt+1 = p p pt Γψt+1       
≡Γt+1
m m mt+1 = b b bt+1 +p p pt+1ξt+1,
where a a at indicates the consumer’s assets at the end of period t,w h i c hg r o wb ya
ﬁxed interest factor R =( 1+r) between periods, so that b b bt+1 is the consumer’s
ﬁnancial (‘bank’) balances before next period’s consumption choice;
4 m m mt+1 (‘market
resources’ or ‘money’) is the sum of ﬁnancial wealth b b bt+1 and noncapital income
p p pt+1ξt+1 (permanent noncapital income p p pt+1 multiplied by a mean-one iid transitory
income shock factor ξt+1 – from the perspective of period t, all future transitory
shocks are assumed to satisfy Et[ξt+n]=1∀ n ≥ 1). Permanent noncapital income
in period t +1is equal to its previous value, multiplied by a growth factor Γ,
2The main results also hold for logarithmic utility which is the limit as ρ → 1 but incorporating the logarithmic
special case in the proofs is cumbersome and therefore omitted.
3We will deﬁne the inﬁnite horizon solution as the limit of the ﬁnite horizon problem as the horizon T − t
approaches inﬁnity.
4Allowing a stochastic interest factor is straightforward but adds little insight. The eﬀects are more interesting
for analysis of the invariant distribution (Szeidl (2006)).
4modiﬁed by a mean-one iid shock ψt+1, Et[ψt+n]=1∀ n ≥ 1 satisfying ψ ∈ [ψ, ¯ ψ]
for 0 < ψ ≤ 1 ≤ ¯ ψ<∞ where ψ = ¯ ψ =1is the degenerate case with no permanent
shocks.
5 (Hereafter for brevity we occasionally drop time subscripts, e.g. E[ψ−ρ]
signiﬁes Et[ψ
−ρ
t+1].)
Following Carroll (1992), assume that in future periods t + n ∀ n ≥ 1 there is a
small probability ℘ that income will be zero (a ‘zero-income event’),
ξt+n =
 
0 with probability ℘>0
θt+n/ ℘ with probability  ℘ ≡ (1 − ℘)
(3)
where θt+n is an iid mean-one random variable (Et[θt+n]=1∀ n>0)t h a th a sa
distribution satisfying θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] where 0 < θ ≤ 1 ≤ ¯ θ<∞ (degenerately θ = ¯ θ =1 ).
Call the cumulative distribution functions Fψ and Fθ (and Fξ is derived trivially
from (3)a n dFθ). Permanent income and cash start out strictly positive, p p pt ∈ (0,∞)
and m m mt ∈ (0,∞), and the consumer cannot die in debt,
c c cT ≤ m m mT. (4)
The model looks more special than it is. In particular, the assumption of a positive
probability of zero-income events may seem objectionable. However, it is easy to
show that a model with a nonzero minimum value of ξ (motivated, for example,
by the existence of unemployment insurance) can be redeﬁned by capitalizing the
PDV of minimum income into current market assets,
6 analytically transforming that
model back into the model analyzed here. Also, the assumption of a positive point
mass (as opposed to positive density) for the worst realization of the transitory
shock is inessential, but simpliﬁes and clariﬁes the proofs and is a powerful aid to
intuition.
This model diﬀers from Bewley’s (1977) classic formulation in several ways. The
CRRA utility function does not satisfy Bewley’s assumption that u(0) is well deﬁned,
or that u (0) is well deﬁned and ﬁnite, so neither the value function nor the marginal
value function will be bounded. It diﬀers from Schectman and Escudero (1977)
in that they impose liquidity constraints and positive minimum income. It dif-
fers from both of these formulations in that it permits permanent growth, and
also permits permanent shocks to income, which a large empirical literature ﬁnds
are to be quantitatively important in micro data (MaCurdy (1982); Abowd and
Card (1989); Carroll and Samwick (1997); Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000); Storeslet-
5It is useful to emphasize that permanent noncapital income as deﬁned here diﬀers from what Deaton (1992)
calls permanent income (which is often adopted in the macro literature). Deaton deﬁnes permanent income as the
amount that a perfect foresight consumer could spend while leaving total (human and nonhuman) wealth constant.
Relatedly, we refer to m m mt as ‘cash-on-hand’ or ‘market resources’ rather than as wealth to avoid any confusion
for readers accustomed to thinking of the discounted value of future noncapital income as a part of wealth. The
‘market resources’ terminology is motivated by the model’s assumption that human wealth cannot be capitalized,
an implication of anti-slavery laws.
6So long as this PDV is a ﬁnite number and unemployment beneﬁts are proportional to p p pt; see the discussion
in section 2.11.
5ten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004); Blundell, Low, and Preston (2008)) and which the
theory since Friedman (1957) suggests are far more consequential for household
welfare than are transitory ﬂuctuations. It diﬀers from Deaton (1991) because
liquidity constraints are absent; there are separate transitory and permanent shocks
(al aMuth (1960)); and the transitory shocks here can occasionally cause income
to reach zero.
7 Finally, it diﬀers from models found in Stokey et. al. (1989) because
neither liquidity constraints nor bounds on utility or marginal utility are imposed.
8
2.2 The Problem Can Be Rewritten in Ratio Form
The number of relevant state variables can be reduced from two (m m m and p p p)t oo n e
(m = m m m/p p p) as follows. Deﬁning nonbold variables as the boldface counterpart
normalized by p p pt (as with mt), assume that value in the last period of life is u(m m mT),
and consider the problem in the second-to-last period,
v v vT−1(m m mT−1,p p pT−1)=m a x
c c cT−1
{u(c c cT−1)+β ET−1[u(m m mT)]}
=m a x
cT−1
{u(p p pT−1cT−1)+β ET−1[u(p p pTmT)]}
= p p p
1−ρ
T−1
 
max
cT−1
u(cT−1)+β ET−1[u(ΓTmT)]
 
. (5)
Now consider the related problem
vt(mt)=m a x
{c}T
t
u(ct)+β Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1vt+1(mt+1)] (6)
s.t.
at = mt − ct
bt+1 =( R/Γt+1)at = Rt+1at
mt+1 = bt+1 + ξt+1
where Rt+1 ≡ (R/Γt+1) is a ‘growth-normalized’ return factor, and the problem’s
ﬁrst order condition is
c
−ρ
t = Rβ Et[Γ
−ρ
t+1c
−ρ
t+1]. (7)
Since vT(mT)=u ( mT), deﬁning vT−1(mT−1) from (6) for t = T − 1,( 5) reduces
to
v v vT−1(m m mT−1,p p pT−1)=p p p
1−ρ
T−1vT−1(m m mT−1/p p pT−1).
This logic induces to all earlier periods, so that if we solve the normalized one-
state-variable problem speciﬁed in (6) we will have solutions to the original problem
7Below it will become clear that the Deaton model is a particular limit of this paper’s model.
8Similar restrictions to those in the cited literature are made in the well known papers by Scheinkman and
Weiss (1986) and Clarida (1987). See Toche (2005) for an elegant analysis of a related but simpler continuous-time
model.
6for any t<Tfrom:
9
v v vt(m m mt,p p pt)=p p p
1−ρ
t vt(
mt       
m m mt/p p pt),
c c ct(m m mt,p p pt)=p p ptct(mt).
2.3 Deﬁnition of a Nondegenerate Solution
We say that a consumption problem has a nondegenerate solution if it deﬁnes a
unique limiting consumption function whose optimal c satisﬁes
0 <c< ∞ (8)
for every 0 <m<∞. (‘Degenerate’ limits will be cases where the limiting con-
sumption function is either c(m)=0or c(m)=∞.)
2.4 Perfect Foresight Benchmarks
The analytical solution to the perfect foresight specialization of the model, obtained
by setting ℘ =0and θ = ¯ θ = ψ = ¯ ψ =1 , provides a useful reference point and
deﬁnes some remaining notation.
2.4.1 Human Wealth
The dynamic budget constraint, strictly positive marginal utility, and the can’t-
die-in-debt condition (4) imply an exactly-holding intertemporal budget constraint
(IBC)
PDVt(c c c)=
b b bt       
m m mt −p p pt +
h h ht       
PDVt(p p p), (9)
where h h ht is ‘human wealth,’ the discounted value of noncapital income, and with a
constant R≡R/Γ, human wealth will be
h h ht = p p pt + R
−1p p pt + R
−2p p pt + ... + R
t−Tp p pt
=
 
1 −R −(T−t+1)
1 −R −1
 
      
≡ht
p p pt. (10)
9v is an exception to the notational convention that boldfaced variables are the nonbold version multiplied by
p p p; the appropriate scaling factor for value is p p p1−ρ.
7(10) makes plain that in order for h ≡ limn→∞ hT−n to be ﬁnite, we must impose
the Finite Human Wealth Condition (‘FHWC’)
Γ/R
    
R−1
< 1. (11)
Intuitively, for human wealth to be ﬁnite, the growth rate of noncapital income must
be smaller than the interest rate at which that income is being discounted.
2.4.2 Unconstrained Solution
In the absence of a liquidity constraint, the consumption Euler equation holds in
every period; with u (c c c)=c c c−ρ,t h i ss a y s
c c c
−ρ
t = Rβc c c
−ρ
t+1
c c ct+1/c c ct =( Rβ)
1/ρ ≡ Þ Þ Þ (12)
where the Old English letter ‘thorn’ represents what we will call the ‘absolute
patience factor’ (Rβ)1/ρ.
10 The sense in which Þ Þ Þ captures patience is that if the
‘absolute impatience condition’ (AIC) holds,
Þ Þ Þ < 1, (13)
the consumer will choose to spend an amount too large to sustain (the level of
consumption must fall over time). We say that such a consumer is ‘absolutely
impatient.’
We next deﬁne a ‘return patience factor’ that relates absolute patience to the
return factor:
Þ Þ ÞR ≡ Þ Þ Þ/R (14)
so that
PDVt(c c c)=
 
1+Þ Þ ÞR +Þ Þ Þ
2
R + ... +Þ Þ Þ
T−t
R
 
c c ct
=
 
1 −Þ Þ Þ
T−t+1
R
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
 
c c ct
from which the IBC (9) implies
c c ct =
≡κt         
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
1 −Þ Þ Þ
T−t+1
R
 
(b b bt +h h ht) (15)
10Impatience conditions of one kind or another have ﬁgured in intertemporal optimization problems since they
were ﬁrst formalized, most notably by Ramsey (1928). Discussion of these issues was prominent in the literature of
the 1960s and 1970s, and no brief citations here could do it justice, so I refrain from the attempt.
8which deﬁnes a normalized ﬁnite-horizon perfect foresight consumption function
¯ cT−n(mT−n)=(
=bT−n       
mT−n − 1+hT−n)κT−n (16)
where κt is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) because it answers the
question ‘if the consumer had an extra unit of wealth, how much more would he
spend.’ Equation (15) makes plain that for the limiting MPC to be strictly positive
as n = T − t goes to inﬁnity we must impose the condition
Þ Þ ÞR < 1, (17)
so that
0 <κ ≡ 1 −Þ Þ ÞR = lim
n→∞κT−n. (18)
Equation (17) thus imposes a second kind of ‘impatience:’ The consumer cannot
be so pathologically patient as to wish, in the limit as the horizon approaches inﬁnity,
to spend nothing today out of an increase in current wealth. This is the condition
that rules out the degenerate limiting solution ¯ c(m)=0 . Henceforth (17) will be
called the ‘return impatience condition’ or RIC, and a consumer who satisﬁes the
condition is called ‘return impatient.’
Given that the RIC holds, and deﬁning limiting objects by the absence of a time
subscript (e.g., ¯ c(m)=l i m n↑∞¯ cT−n(m)), the limiting consumption function will be
¯ c(mt)=( mt + h − 1)κ, (19)
and we now see that in order to rule out the degenerate limiting solution ¯ c(mt)=∞
we need h to be ﬁnite so we must impose the ﬁnite human wealth condition (11).
A ﬁnal useful point is that since the perfect foresight growth factor for consump-
tion is Þ Þ Þ, using u(xy)=x1−ρu(y) yields the following expression for value:
vt =u ( ct)+βu(ctÞ Þ Þ)+β
2u(ctÞ Þ Þ
2)+...
=u ( ct)
 
1+βÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ +( βÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ)
2 + ...
 
=u ( ct)
 
1 − (βÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ)T−t+1
1 − βÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ
 
which asymptotes to a ﬁnite value as n = T − t approaches +∞ if βÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ < 1; with
a bit of algebra, this requirement can be shown to be equivalent to the RIC.
11 Thus,
11
β((Rβ)1/ρ)1−ρ < 1
β(Rβ)1/ρ/Rβ<1
(Rβ)1/ρ/R < 1
.
9the same conditions that guarantee a nondegenerate limiting consumption function
also guarantee a nondegenerate limiting value function.
2.4.3 Constrained Solution
If the liquidity constraint is ever to be relevant, it must be relevant at the lowest
possible level of market resources, mt =1 , which obtains for a consumer who enters
period t with bt =0 . The constraint is ‘relevant’ if it prevents the choice that would
otherwise be optimal; at mt =1the constraint is relevant if the marginal utility
from spending all of today’s resources ct = mt =1 , exceeds the marginal utility from
doing the same thing next period, ct+1 =1 ; that is, if such choices would violate the
Euler equation (7):
1
−ρ > Rβ(Γ)
−ρ1
−ρ. (20)
By analogy to the return patience factor, we therefore deﬁne a ‘perfect foresight
growth patience factor’ as
Þ Þ ÞΓ = Þ Þ Þ/Γ, (21)
and deﬁne a ‘perfect foresight growth impatience condition’ (PF-GIC)
Þ Þ ÞΓ < 1 (22)
which is equivalent to (20) (exponentiate both sides by 1/ρ).
If the RIC and the FHWC hold, appendix A shows that an unconstrained con-
sumer behaving according to (19) would choose c<mfor all m>m # for some
0 <m # < 1. The solution to the constrained consumer’s problem in this case is
simple: For any m ≥ m# the constraint does not bind (and will never bind in the
future) and so the constrained consumption function is identical to the unconstrained
one. In principle, if the consumer were somehow to arrive at an m<m # < 1 the
constraint would bind and the consumer would have to consume c = m (though
such values of m are of questionable relevance because they could only be obtained
by entering the period with b<0 which the constraint rules out). We use the ◦
accent to designate the limiting constrained consumption function:
˚ c(m)=
 
m if m<m #
¯ c(m) if m ≥ m#.
(23)
More useful is the case where the PF-GIC Þ Þ Þ/Γ < 1 and the RIC Þ Þ Þ/R < 1 both
hold. In this case appendix A shows that the limiting constrained consumption func-
tion is piecewise linear, with˚ c(m)=m up to a ﬁrst ‘kink point’ at m1
# > 1, and with
discrete declines in the MPC at successively increasing kink points {m1
#,m 2
#,...}.A s
m ↑∞the constrained consumption function ˚ c(m) approaches arbitrarily close to
the unconstrained ¯ c(m), and the marginal propensity to consume function ˚ κ κ κ(m) ≡
10˚ c (m) limits to κ. Similarly, the value function ˚ v(m) is nondegenerate and limits
into the value function of the unconstrained consumer. Surprisingly, this logic holds
even when the ﬁnite human wealth condition fails (denoted  FHWC). A solution
exists because the constraint prevents the consumer from borrowing against inﬁnite
human wealth to ﬁnance inﬁnite current consumption. Under these circumstances,
the consumer who starts with any amount of resources bt > 1 will run those resources
down over time so that by some ﬁnite number of periods n in the future the consumer
will reach bt+n =0 , and thereafter will set c = m =1for eternity, a policy that will
yield value of
v v vt+n =u ( p p pt+n)
 
1+βΓ
1−ρ +( βΓ
1−ρ)
2 + ...
 
=Γ
n(1−ρ)u(p p pt)
 
1 − (βΓ1−ρ)T−(t+n)+1
1 − βΓ1−ρ
 
,
which will be a ﬁnite number whenever
≡        
βΓ
1−ρ < 1 (24)
βRΓ
−ρ < R/Γ
Þ Þ ÞΓ < (R/Γ)
1/ρ (25)
which we call the Perfect Foresight Finite Value of Autarky Condition, PF-FVAC,
because it guarantees that a consumer who always spends all his permanent income
will have ﬁnite value (the consumer has ‘ﬁnite autarky value’). Note that the version
of the PF-FVAC in (25) implies the PF-GIC Þ Þ ÞΓ < 1 whenever  FHWC R < Γ
holds. So, if the  FHWC holds, value for any ﬁnite m will be the sum of two ﬁnite
numbers: The component due to the unconstrained consumption choice made over
the ﬁnite horizon leading up to bt+n =0 , and the ﬁnite component due to the value
of consuming all income thereafter. The consumer’s value function is therefore
nondegenerate.
The most peculiar possibility occurs when the RIC fails. Remarkably, the ap-
pendix shows that although under these circumstances the FHWC must also fail, the
constrained consumption function is nondegenerate even in this case. While it is true
that limm↑∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=0 , nevertheless the limiting constrained consumption function
˚ c(m) is strictly positive and strictly increasing in m. This result interestingly
reconciles the conﬂicting intuitions from the unconstrained case, where   RIC would
suggest a dengenerate limit of ˚ c(m)=0while  FHWC would suggest a degenerate
limit of˚ c(m)=∞.
Tables 2 and 3 (and appendix table 4) codify the key points to help the reader
keep them straight (and to facilitate upcoming comparisons with the surprisingly
11parallel results in the presence of uncertainty but the absence of liquidity constraints
(also tabulated)).
2.5 Uncertainty-Modiﬁed Conditions
2.5.1 Impatience
When uncertainty is introduced, the expectation of bt+1 can be rewritten as:
Et[bt+1]=at Et[Rt+1]=atREt[ψ
−1
t+1] (26)
where Jensen’s inequality guarantees that the expectation of the inverse of the
permanent shock is strictly greater than one. It will be convenient to deﬁne the
object
ψ ≡ (E[ψ
−1])
−1
because this permits us to write expressions like the RHS of (26) compactly as, e.g.,
atRψ
−1.
12 We refer to this as the ‘return compensated’ permanent shock, because it
compensates for the eﬀect of uncertainty on the expected growth-normalized return
(in the sense implicitly deﬁned in (26)). Note that Jensen’s inequality implies that
ψ < 1 for nondegenerate ψ (since E[ψ]=1by assumption).
Using this deﬁnition, we can transparently generalize the PF-GIC (22) by deﬁning
a ‘compensated growth factor’
Γ =Γ ψ (27)
and a compensated growth patience factor
Þ Þ ÞΓ = Þ Þ Þ/Γ (28)
and a straightforward derivation using some of the results below yields the conclusion
that
lim
mt→∞Et[mt+1/mt]=Þ Þ ÞΓ,
which implies that if we wish to prevent m from heading to inﬁnity (that is, if we
want m to be guaranteed to be expected to fall for some large enough value of
m) we must impose a generalized version of (22) which we call simply the ‘growth
impatience condition’ (GIC):
13
Þ Þ ÞΓ < 1 (29)
which is stronger than the perfect foresight version (22) because Γ < Γ.
12One way to think of ψ is as a particular kind of a ‘certainty equivalent’ of the shock; this captures the intuition
that mean-one shock renders a given mean level of income less valuable than if the shock did not exist, so that
ψ < 1.
13Equation (29) is a bit easier to satisfy than the similar condition imposed by Deaton (1991):

E[ψ−ρ]
1/ρÞ Þ ÞΓ <
1 to guarantee that his problem deﬁned a contraction mapping.
122.5.2 Value
A consumer who spent his permanent income every period would have value
v v vt = Et
 
u(p p pt)+βu(p p ptΓt+1)+... + β
T−tu(p p ptΓt+1...ΓT)
 
=u ( p p pt)
 
1+β Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1]+... + β
T−t Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1]...Et[Γ
1−ρ
T ]
 
=u ( p p pt)
 
1 − (βΓ1−ρ E[ψ1−ρ])T−t+1
1 − βΓ1−ρ E[ψ1−ρ]
 
which invites the deﬁnition of a utility-compensated equivalent of the permanent
shock,
ψ =( E[ψ
1−ρ])
1/(1−ρ)
which will satisfy ψ < 1 for ρ>1 and nondegenerate ψ (and ψ <ψfor the preferred
(though not required) case of ρ>2); deﬁning Γ =Γ ψ we can see that v v vt will be
ﬁnite as T approaches ∞ if
≡ 
      
βΓ
1−ρ < 1 (30)
β<Γ
ρ−1
which we call the ‘ﬁnite value of autarky’ condition (FVAC) because it is the value
obtained by always consuming permanent income, and which for nondegenerate ψ
is stronger (harder to satisfy in the sense of requiring lower β) than the perfect
foresight version (24) because Γ < Γ.
2.6 The Baseline Numerical Solution
Figure 1 depicts the successive consumption rules that apply in the last period of
life (cT(m)), the second-to-last period, and various earlier periods under the baseline
parameter values listed in Table 1. (The 45 degree line is labelled as cT(m)=m
because in the last period of life it is optimal to spend all remaining resources.)
In the ﬁgure, the consumption rules appear to converge as the horizon recedes
(below we show that this appearance is not deceptive); we call the limiting inﬁnite-
horizon consumption rule
c(m) ≡ lim
n→∞cT−n(m). (31)
13Table 1 Microeconomic Model Calibration
Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Value Source
Permanent Income Growth Factor Γ 1.03 PSID: Carroll (1992)
Interest Factor R 1.04 Conventional
Time Preference Factor β 0.96 Conventional
Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion ρ 2 Conventional
Probability of Zero Income ℘ 0.005 PSID: Carroll (1992)
Std Dev of Log Permanent Shock σψ 0.1 PSID: Carroll (1992)
Std Dev of Log Transitory Shock σθ 0.1 PSID: Carroll (1992)
Model Characteristics Calculated From Parameters
Approximate
Calculated
Description Symbol and Formula Value
Finite Human Wealth Measure R−1 ≡ Γ/R 0.990
PF Finite Value of Autarky Measure   ≡ βΓ1−ρ 0.932
Growth Compensated Permanent Shock ψ ≡ (E[ψ−1])−1 0.990
Uncertainty-Adjusted Growth Γ ≡ Γψ 1.020
Utility Compensated Permanent Shock ψ ≡ (Et[ψ1−ρ])1/(1−ρ) 0.990
Utility Compensated Growth Γ ≡ Γψ 1.020
Absolute Patience Factor Þ Þ Þ ≡ (Rβ)1/ρ 0.999
Return Patience Factor Þ Þ ÞR ≡ R−1(Rβ)1/ρ 0.961
PF Growth Patience Factor Þ Þ ÞΓ ≡ Γ−1(Rβ)1/ρ 0.970
Growth Patience Factor Þ Þ ÞΓ ≡ Γ
−1(Rβ)1/ρ 0.980
Finite Value of Autarky Measure   ≡ βΓ1−ρψ
1−ρ 0.941
14  cT   45 Degree Line
cT 1 
cT 5 
cT 10
c

c
Figure 1 Convergence of the Consumption Rules
2.7 Concave Consumption Function Characteristics
A precondition for the main proof is that the maximization problem (6)d e ﬁ n e sa
sequence of continuously diﬀerentiable strictly increasing strictly concave
14 functions
{cT,cT−1,...}.
15 The proof of this precondition is straightforward but tedious, and
so is relegated to appendix B. For present purposes, the most important point is
the following intuition: ct(m) <mfor all periods t<Tbecause if the consumer
spent all available resources, he would arrive in period t +1with balances bt+1 of
zero, then might earn zero noncapital income for the rest of his life (an unbroken
series of zero-income events is unlikely but possible). In such a case, the budget
constraint and the can’t-die-in-debt condition mean that the consumer would be
forced to spend zero, incurring negative inﬁnite utility. To avoid this disaster, the
consumer never spends everything. (This is an example of the ‘natural borrowing
constraint’ induced by a precautionary motive (Zeldes (1989)).)
16
14There is one obvious exception: cT(m) is a linear (and so only weakly concave) function.
15Carroll and Kimball (1996) proved concavity but not the other desired properties.
16It would perhaps be better to call it the ‘utility-induced borrowing constraint’ as it follows from the assumptions
on the utility function (in particular, limc↓0 u(c)=−∞); for example, no such constraint arises if utility is of the
(implausible) Constant Absolute Risk Aversion form.
152.8 Bounds for the Consumption Functions
The consumption functions depicted in Figure 1 appear to have limiting slopes as
m ↓ 0 and as m ↑∞ . This section conﬁrms that impression and derives those slopes,
which also turn out to be useful in the contraction mapping proof.
Assume (as discussed above) that a continuously diﬀerentiable concave consump-
tion function exists in period t +1 , with an origin at ct+1(0) = 0, a minimal MPC
κt+1 > 0, and maximal MPC ¯ κt+1 ≤ 1. (If t +1=T these will be κT =¯ κT =1 ; for
earlier periods they will exist by recursion from the following arguments.)
For mt > 0 we can deﬁne et(mt)=c t(mt)/mt and at(mt)=mt − ct(mt) and the
Euler equation (7) can be rewritten
et(mt)
−ρ = βREt
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
et+1(mt+1)
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
=mt+1Γt+1       
Rat(mt)+Γ t+1ξt+1
mt
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
−ρ⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(32)
=  ℘βRm
ρ
t Et
 
(et+1(mt+1)mt+1Γt+1)
−ρ | ξt+1 > 0
 
+℘βR
1−ρ Et
  
et+1(Rt+1at(mt))
mt − ct(mt)
mt
 −ρ
| ξt+1 =0
 
.(33)
beginCDC
It is worthwhile to point out here that, although et(mt) by deﬁnition refers to
average propensity to consume (‘APC’), when m → 0 and m →∞ , the two APCs
are also MPCs. This is due to L’Hôpital’s Rule, because both the denominator and
the numerator will go to 0 as mt → 0 and to ∞ as mt →∞(e.g. limmt→0
ct(mt)
mt =
limmt→0
c 
t(mt)
1 = limmt→0 c 
t(mt)). endCDC
Consider the ﬁrst conditional expectation in (33), recalling that if ξt+1 > 0 then
ξt+1 ≡ θt+1/ ℘. Since limm↓0 at(m)=0 , Et[(et+1(mt+1)mt+1Γt+1)−ρ | ξt+1 > 0] is
contained within bounds deﬁned by (et+1(θ/ ℘)Γψθ/ ℘)−ρ and (et+1(¯ θ/ ℘)Γ ¯ ψ¯ θ/ ℘)−ρ
both of which are ﬁnite numbers, implying that the whole term multiplied by
 ℘ goes to zero as m
ρ
t goes to zero. As mt ↓ 0 the expectation in the other
term goes to ¯ κ
−ρ
t+1(1 − ¯ κt)−ρ. (This follows from the strict concavity and diﬀer-
entiability of the consumption function.) It follows that the limiting ¯ κt satisﬁes
¯ κ
−ρ
t = β℘R1−ρ¯ κ
−ρ
t+1(1 − ¯ κt)−ρ. We can conclude that
¯ κt = ℘
−1/ρ(βR)
−1/ρR(1 − ¯ κt)¯ κt+1
℘
1/ρ
Þ Þ ÞR       
R
−1(βR)
1/ρ
      
≡℘1/ρÞ Þ ÞR
¯ κt =( 1 − ¯ κt)¯ κt+1 (34)
which yields a useful recursive formula for the maximal marginal propensity to
16consume:
(℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR¯ κt)
−1 =( 1 − ¯ κt)
−1¯ κ
−1
t+1
¯ κ
−1
t (1 − ¯ κt)=℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR¯ κ
−1
t+1
¯ κ
−1
t =1 + ℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR¯ κ
−1
t+1. (35)
Then
 
¯ κ
−1
T−n
 ∞
n=0 is an increasing convergent sequence if
0 ≤ ℘1/ρÞ Þ ÞR < 1, (36)
a condition that we dub the ‘Weak Return Impatience Condition’ (WRIC) because
with ℘<1 it will hold more easily (for a larger set of parameter values) than the
RIC (Þ Þ ÞR < 1).
Since ¯ κT =1 , iterating (35) backward to inﬁnity (because we are interested in the
limiting consumption function) we obtain:
lim
n→∞ ¯ κT−n =¯ κ ≡ 1 − ℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR (37)
and we will therefore call ¯ κ the ‘limiting maximal MPC.’
The minimal MPC’s are obtained by considering the case where mt ↑∞ .I ft h e
FHWC holds, then as mt ↑∞the proportion of current and future consumption
that will be ﬁnanced out of capital approaches 1. Thus, the terms involving ξt+1 in
(32) can be neglected, leading to a revised limiting Euler equation
(mtet(mt))
−ρ = βREt
 
(et+1(at(mt)Rt+1)(Rat(mt)))
−ρ 
and we know from L’Hôpital’s rule that limmt→∞ et(mt)=κt,a n dlimmt→∞ et+1(at(mt)Rt+1)=
κt+1 so a further limit of the Euler equation is
(mtκt)
−ρ = βR
 
κt+1R(1 − κt)mt
 −ρ
R
−1Þ Þ Þ       
≡Þ Þ ÞR=(1−κ)
κt =( 1 − κt)κt+1
and the same sequence of derivations used above yields the conclusion that if the
RIC 0 ≤ Þ Þ ÞR < 1 holds, then a recursive formula for the minimal marginal propensity
to consume is given by
κ
−1
t =1 + κ
−1
t+1Þ Þ ÞR (38)
so that {κ
−1
T−n}∞
n=0 is also an increasing convergent sequence, with κ being the
‘limiting minimal MPC.’ If the RIC does not hold, then limn→∞ κ
−1
T−n = ∞ and
so the limiting MPC is κ =0 .
We are now in position to observe that the optimal consumption function must
satisfy
κtmt ≤ ct(mt) ≤ ¯ κtmt (39)
because consumption starts at zero and is continuously diﬀerentiable (as argued
17above), is strictly concave (Carroll and Kimball (1996)), and always exhibits a slope
between κt and ¯ κt (the formal proof is provided in appendix D).
2.9 Conditions Under Which the Problem Deﬁnes a Contraction
Mapping
To prove that the consumption rules converge, we need to show that the problem
deﬁnes a contraction mapping. This cannot be proven using the standard theorems
in, say, Stokey et. al. (1989), which require marginal utility to be bounded over
the space of possible values of m, because the possibility (however unlikely) of an
unbroken string of zero-income events for the remainder of life means that as m
approaches zero c must approach zero (see the discussion in 2.7); thus, marginal
utility is unbounded. Fortunately, Boyd (1990) provides a weighted contraction
mapping theorem that can be used. To use Boyd’s theorem we need
Deﬁnition 1. Consider any function •∈C (A,B) where C(A,B) is the space of
continuous functions from A to B. Suppose   ∈C (A,B) with B ⊆ R and   > 0.
Then • is  -bounded if the  -norm of •,
 •    =s u p
m
 
|•(m)|
 (m)
 
, (40)
is ﬁnite.
For C  (A,B) deﬁned as the set of functions in C(A,B) that are  -bounded; w,
x, y,a n dz as examples of  -bounded functions; and using 0(m)=0to indicate the
function that returns zero for any argument, Boyd (1990) proves the following.
Boyd’s Weighted Contraction Mapping Theorem. Let T : C  (A,B) →
C (A,B) such that
17,18
1) T is non-decreasing, i.e. x ≤ y ⇒{ Tx}≤{ Ty}
2) {T0}∈ C   (A,B)
3) There exists some real 0 <ξ<1, such that
{T(w + ζ )}≤{ Tw} + ζξ  holds for all real ζ>0 .
Then T deﬁnes a contraction with a unique ﬁxed point.
For our problem, take A as R++ and B as R, and deﬁne
{Ez}(at)=Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1z(atRt+1 + ξt+1)
 
.
17We will usually denote the function that results from the mapping as, e.g., {Tw}.
18To non-theorists, this notation may be slightly confusing; the inequality relations in 1) and 3) are taken
to mean ‘for any speciﬁc element • in the domain of the functions in question’ so that, e.g., x ≤ y is short for
x(•) ≤ y(•) ∀•∈A. In this notation, ζξ  in 3) is a function which can be applied to any argument • (because  
is a function).
18Using this, we introduce the mapping T : C  (A,B) →C(A,B),
19
{Tz}(mt)= m a x
ct∈[κmt,¯ κmt]
u(ct)+β ({Ez}(mt − ct)). (41)
We can show that our operator T satisﬁes the conditions that Boyd requires
of his operator T, if we impose two restrictions on parameter values. The ﬁrst
restriction is the WRIC necessary for convergence of the maximal MPC, equation
(36) above. A more serious restriction is the utility-compensated Finite Value of
Autarky condition, equation (30). (We discuss the interpretation of these restrictions
in detail in section 2.11 below.) Imposing these restrictions, we are now in position
to state the central theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1. T is a contraction mapping if the restrictions on parameter values (36)
and (30) are true.
The proof is cumbersome, and therefore relegated to appendix D. Given that
the value function converges, appendix D.3 shows that the consumption functions
converge.
2.10 The Liquidity Constrained Solution as a Limit
This section shows that a related problem commonly considered in the literature
(e.g. with a simpler income process by Deaton (1991)), with a liquidity constraint
and a positive minimum value of income, is the limit of the problem considered here
as the probability ℘ of the zero-income event approaches zero.
Formally, suppose we change the description of the problem by making the fol-
lowing two assumptions:
℘ =0
ct ≤ mt,
and we designate the solution to this consumer’s problem ` ct(m). We will henceforth
refer to this as the problem of the ‘restrained’ consumer (and, to avoid a common
confusion, we will refer to the consumer as ‘constrained’ only in circumstances when
the constraint is actually binding).
Redesignate the consumption function that emerges from our original problem
for a given ﬁxed ℘ as ct(m;℘) where we separate the arguments by a semicolon
to distinguish between m, which is a state variable, and ℘, which is not. The
proposition we wish to demonstrate is
lim
℘↓0
ct(m;℘)=` ct(m).
19Note that the existence of the maximum is assured by the continuity of {Ez}(at) (it is continuous because it
is the sum of continuous  -bounded functions z) and the compactness of [κmt, ¯ κmt].
19We will ﬁrst examine the problem in period T − 1, then argue that the desired
result propagates to earlier periods. For simplicity, suppose that the interest, growth,
and time-preference factors are β = R =Γ=1 , and there are no permanent shocks,
ψ =1 ; the results below are easily generalized to the full-ﬂedged version of the
problem.
The solution to the restrained consumer’s optimization problem can be obtained
as follows. Assuming that the consumer’s behavior in period T is given by cT(m) (in
practice, this will be cT(m)=m), consider the unrestrained optimization problem
` a
∗
T−1(m) = argmax
a
 
u(m − a)+
  ¯ θ
θ
vT(a + θ)dFθ
 
. (42)
As usual, the envelope theorem tells us that v 
T(m)=u  (cT(m)) so the expected
marginal value of ending period T − 1 with assets a can be deﬁned as
` v
 
T−1(a) ≡
  ¯ θ
θ
u
 (cT(a + θ))dFθ,
and the solution to (42) will satisfy
u
 (m − a)=` v
 
T−1(a). (43)
` a∗
T−1(m) therefore answers the question “With what level of assets would the
restrained consumer like to end period T − 1 if the constraint cT−1 ≤ mT−1 did
not exist?” (Note that the restrained consumer’s income process remains diﬀerent
from the process for the unrestrained consumer so long as ℘>0.) The restrained
consumer’s actual asset position will be
` aT−1(m)=m a x [ 0 ,` a
∗
T−1(m)],
reﬂecting the inability of the restrained consumer to spend more than current
resources, and note (as pointed out by Deaton (1991)) that
m
1
# =
 
` v
 
T−1(0)
 −1/ρ
is the cusp value of m at which the constraint makes the transition between binding
and non-binding in period T − 1.
Analogously to (43), deﬁning
v
 
T−1(a;℘) ≡
 
℘a
−ρ +  ℘
  ¯ θ
θ
(cT(a + θ/ ℘))
−ρ dFθ
 
, (44)
the Euler equation for the original consumer’s problem implies
(m − a)
−ρ = v
 
T−1(a;℘) (45)
with solution a∗
T−1(m;℘). Now note that for any ﬁxed a>0, lim℘↓0 v 
T−1(a;℘)=
` v 
T−1(a). Since the LHS of (43)a n d( 45) are identical, this means that
20lim℘↓0 a∗
T−1(m;℘)=` a∗
T−1(m). That is, for any ﬁxed value of m>m 1
# such
that the consumer subject to the restraint would voluntarily choose to end the
period with positive assets, the level of end-of-period assets for the unrestrained
consumer approaches the level for the restrained consumer as ℘ ↓ 0. With the
same a and the same m, the consumers must have the same c, so the consumption
functions are identical in the limit.
Now consider values m ≤ m1
# for which the restrained consumer is constrained.
It is obvious that the baseline consumer will never choose a ≤ 0 because the ﬁrst
term in (44)i slima↓0 ℘a−ρ = ∞, while lima↓0(m−a)−ρ is ﬁnite (the marginal value
of end-of-period assets approaches inﬁnity as assets approach zero, but the marginal
utility of consumption has a ﬁnite limit for m>0). The subtler question is whether
it is possible to rule out strictly positive a for the unrestrained consumer.
The answer is yes. Suppose, for some m<m 1
#, that the unrestrained consumer
is considering ending the period with any positive amount of assets a = δ>0.F o r
any such δ we have that lim℘↓0 v 
T−1(a;℘)=` v 
T−1(a). But by assumption we are
considering a set of circumstances in which ` a∗
T−1(m) < 0, and we showed earlier that
lim℘↓0 a∗
T−1(m;℘)=` a∗
T−1(m). So, having assumed a = δ>0, we have proven that
the consumer would optimally choose a<0, which is a contradiction. A similar
argument holds for m = m1
#.
These arguments demonstrate that for any m>0, lim℘↓0 cT−1(m;℘)=` cT−1(m)
which is the period T − 1 version of (42). But given equality of the period T − 1
consumption functions, backwards recursion of the same arguments demonstrates
that the limiting consumption functions in previous periods are also identical to the
constrained function.
Note ﬁnally that another intuitive conﬁrmation of the equivalence between the two
problems is that our formula (37) for the maximal marginal propensity to consume
satisﬁes
lim
℘↓0
¯ κ =1 ,
which makes sense because the marginal propensity to consume for a constrained
restrained consumer is 1 by our deﬁnitions of ‘constrained’ and ‘restrained.’
2.11 Discussion of Parametric Restrictions
2.11.1 The RIC
In the perfect foresight unconstrained problem (section 2.4.2), the RIC was required
for existence of a nondegenerate solution. It is surprising, therefore, that in the
presence of uncertainty, the RIC is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for a nondegen-
erate solution to exist. We therefore begin our discussion by asking what features
21the problem must exhibit (given the FVAC) if the RIC fails (that is, R < (Rβ)1/ρ):
R <
implied by FVAC
      
(Rβ)
1/ρ < (R(Γψ)
ρ−1)
1/ρ
R < (R/Γ)
1/ρΓψ
1−1/ρ
R/Γ < (R/Γ)
1/ρψ
1−1/ρ
(R/Γ)
1−1/ρ <ψ
1−1/ρ (46)
but since ψ < 1 and 0 < 1 − 1/ρ < 1 (because we have assumed ρ>1), this can
hold only if R/Γ < 1; that is, given the FVAC, the RIC can fail only if human
wealth is unbounded. Unbounded human wealth is permitted here, as in the perfect
foresight liquidity constrained problem. But, from equation (38), an implication
of   RIC is that limm↑∞ c (m)=0 . Thus, interestingly, the presence of uncertainty
both permits unlimited human wealth and at the same time prevents that unlimited
wealth from resulting in inﬁnite consumption. That is, in the presence of uncertainty,
pathological patience (which in the perfect foresight model with ﬁnite wealth results
in consumption of zero) plus inﬁnite human wealth (which the perfect foresight
model rules out because it leads to inﬁnite consumption) combine here to yield a
unique ﬁnite limiting level of consumption for any ﬁnite value of m. Note the close
parallel to the conclusion in the perfect foresight liquidity constrained model in the
{PF-GIC,  RIC} case (for detailed analysis of this case see the appendix). There, too,
the tension between inﬁnite human wealth and pathological patience was resolved
with a nondegenerate consumption function whose limiting MPC was zero.
2.11.2 The WRIC
The ‘weakness’ of the additional requirement for contraction, the weak RIC, can
be seen by asking ‘under what circumstances would the FVAC hold but the WRIC
fail?’ Algebraically, the requirement is
βΓ
1−ρψ
1−ρ < 1 < (℘β)
1/ρ/R
1−1/ρ. (47)
If there were no conceivable parameter values that could satisfy both of these
inequalities, the WRIC would have no force; it would be redundant. And if we
require R ≥ 1, the WRIC is indeed redundant because now β<1 < Rρ−1,s ot h a t
the RIC (and WRIC) must hold.
But neither theory nor evidence demands that we assume R ≥ 1. We can therefore
approach the question of the WRIC’s relevance by asking just how low R must be
for the condition to be relevant. Suppose for illustration that ρ =2 , ψ
1−ρ =1 .01,
22Γ1−ρ =1 .01−1 and ℘ =0 .10. In that case (47) reduces to
β< 1 < (0.1β/R)
1/2
but since β<1 by assumption, the binding requirement is that
R <β / 10
so that for example if β =0 .96 we would need R < 0.096 (that is, a perpetual
riskfree rate of return of worse than -90 percent a year) in order for the WRIC to
bind. Thus, the relevance of the WRIC is indeed “Weak.”
Perhaps the best way of thinking about this is to note that the space of parameter
values for which the WRIC is relevant shrinks out of existence as ℘ → 0,w h i c h
section 2.10 showed was the precise limiting condition under which behavior becomes
arbitrarily close to the liquidity constrained solution (in the absence of other risks).
On the other hand, when ℘ =1 , the consumer has no noncapital income (so that
the FHWC holds) and with ℘ =1the WRIC is identical to the RIC; but the RIC
is the only condition required for a solution to exist for a perfect foresight consumer
with no noncapital income. Thus the WRIC forms a sort of ‘bridge’ between the
liquidity constrained and the unconstrained problems as ℘ moves from 0 to 1.
2.11.3 The GIC
If both the GIC and the RIC hold, the arguments above establish that the limiting
consumption function asymptotes to the consumption function for the perfect fore-
sight unconstrained function. The more interesting case is where the GIC fails. A
solution that satisﬁes the combination FVAC and   GIC is depicted in Figure 2.T h e
consumption function is shown along with the Et[Δmt+1]=0locus that identiﬁes
the ‘sustainable’ level of spending at which m is expected to remain unchanged.
The diagram suggests a fact that is conﬁrmed by deeper analysis: Under the
depicted conﬁguration of parameter values (see the software archive for details), the
consumption function never reaches the Et[Δmt+1]=0locus; indeed, when the RIC
holds but the GIC does not, the consumption function’s limiting slope (1 − Þ Þ Þ/R)
is shallower than that of the sustainable consumption locus (1 − Γ/R),
20 so the
gap between the two actually increases with m in the limit. That is, although a
nondegenerate consumption function exists, a target level of m does not (or, rather,
the target is m = ∞), because no matter how wealthy a consumer becomes, he will
always spend less than the amount that would keep m stable (in expectation).
For the reader’s convenience, Tables 2 and 3 present a summary of the connections
between the various conditions in the presence and the absence of uncertainty.
20This is because Et[mt+1]=Et[Rt+1(mt − ct)] + 1; solve m =( m − c)Rψ−1 +1for c and diﬀerentiate.
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Figure 2 Example Solution when FVAC Holds but GIC Does Not
24Table 2 Deﬁnitions and Comparisons of Conditions
Perfect Foresight Versions Uncertainty Versions
Finite Human Wealth Condition (FHWC)
Γ/R < 1 Γ/R < 1
The growth factor for permanent income
Γ must be smaller than the discounting
factor R, for human wealth to be ﬁnite.
The model’s risks are mean-preserving
spreads, so the PDV of future income is
unchanged by their introduction.
Absolute Impatience Condition (AIC)
Þ Þ Þ < 1 Þ Þ Þ < 1
The unconstrained consumer is
suﬃciently impatient that the level of
consumption will be declining over time:
If wealth is large enough, the expectation
of consumption next period will be
smaller than this period’s consumption:
c c ct+1 <c c ct limmt→∞ Et[c c ct+1] <c c ct
Return Impatience Conditions
Return Impatience Condition (RIC) Weak RIC (WRIC)
Þ Þ Þ/R < 1 ℘1/ρÞ Þ Þ/R < 1
The growth factor for consumption Þ Þ Þ
must be smaller than the discounting
factor R, so that the PDV of current and
future consumption will be ﬁnite:
If the probability of the zero-income
event is ℘ =1then income is always zero
and the condition becomes identical to
the RIC. Otherwise, weaker.
c (m)=1−Þ Þ Þ/R < 1 c (m) < 1 − ℘1/ρÞ Þ Þ/R < 1
Growth Impatience Conditions
PF-GIC GIC
Þ Þ Þ/Γ < 1 Þ Þ ÞE[ψ−1]/Γ < 1
Guarantees that for an unconstrained
consumer, the ratio of consumption to
permanent income will fall over time. For
a constrained consumer, guarantees the
constraint will eventually be binding.
By Jensen’s inequality, stronger than the
PF-GIC. Ensures consumers will not
expect to accumulate m unboundedly.
limmt→∞ Et[mt+1/mt]=Þ Þ ÞΓ
Finite Value of Autarky Conditions
PF-FVAC FVAC
βΓ1−ρ < 1 βΓ1−ρ E[ψ1−ρ] < 1
equivalently Þ Þ Þ/Γ < (R/Γ)1/ρ
The discounted utility of constrained
consumers who spend their permanent
income each period should be ﬁnite.
By Jensen’s inequality, stronger than the
PF-FVAC because for ρ>1 and
nondegenerate ψ, E[ψ1−ρ] > 1.
25Table 3 Suﬃcient Conditions for Nondegenerate‡ Solution
Model Conditions Comments
PF Unconstrained RIC, FHWC◦ RIC ⇒| v(m)| < ∞; FHWC ⇒ 0 < |v(m)|
RIC prevents ¯ c(m)=0
FHWC prevents ¯ c(m)=∞
PF Constrained PF-GIC∗ If RIC, limm→∞˚ c(m)=¯ c(m),limm→∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=κ
If   RIC, limm→∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=0
Buﬀer Stock Model FVAC, WRIC FHWC ⇒ limm→∞˚ c(m)=¯ c(m),limm→∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=κ
 FHWC+RIC ⇒ limm→∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=κ
 FHWC+  RIC ⇒ limm→∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=0
GIC guarantees ﬁnite target wealth ratio
FVAC is stronger than PF-FVAC
WRIC is weaker than RIC
‡For feasible m, limiting consumption function deﬁnes unique value of c satisfying 0 <c<∞. ◦RIC, FHWC are necessary as well
as suﬃcient. ∗Solution also exists for  PF-GIC and RIC, but is identical to the unconstrained model’s solution for feasible m ≥ 1.
3 Analysis of the Converged Consumption Function
Figures 3 and 4a,b capture the main properties of the converged consumption
rule when the RIC, GIC, and FHWC all hold.
21 Figure 3 shows the expected
consumption growth factor Et[c c ct+1/c c ct] for a consumer behaving according to the
converged consumption rule, while Figures 4a,b illustrate theoretical bounds for the
consumption function and the marginal propensity to consume.
Five features of behavior are captured, or suggested, by the ﬁgures. First, as
mt ↑∞the expected consumption growth factor goes to Þ Þ Þ, indicated by the
lower bound in Figure 3, and the marginal propensity to consume approaches
κ =( 1−Þ Þ ÞR) (Figure 4), the same as the perfect foresight MPC.
22 Second, as mt ↓ 0
the consumption growth factor approaches ∞ (Figure 3) and the MPC approaches
¯ κ =( 1− ℘1/ρÞ Þ ÞR) (Figure 4). Third (Figure 3), there is a target cash-on-hand-to-
income ratio ˇ m such that if mt =ˇ m then Et[mt+1]=mt, and (as indicated by the
arrows of motion on the Et[c c ct+1/c c ct] curve), the model’s dynamics are ‘stable’ around
the target in the sense that if mt < ˇ m then cash-on-hand will rise (in expectation),
while if mt > ˇ m, it will fall (in expectation). Fourth (Figure 3), at the target m,t h e
expected rate of growth of consumption is slightly less than the expected growth
rate of permanent noncapital income. The ﬁnal proposition suggested by Figure 3
is that the expected consumption growth factor is declining in the level of the cash-
21These ﬁgures reﬂect the converged rule corresponding to the parameter values indicated in Table 1.
22If the RIC fails, the limiting minimal MPC is 0; see appendix.
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on-hand ratio mt. This turns out to be true in the absence of permanent shocks,
but in extreme cases it can be false if permanent shocks are present.
23
3.1 Limits as mt →∞
Deﬁne
c(m)=κm
which is the solution to an inﬁnite-horizon problem with no noncapital income
(ξt+n =0∀ n ≥ 1); clearly c(m) < c(m), since allowing the possibility of future
noncapital income cannot reduce current consumption.
24
Assuming the FHWC holds, the inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight solution (19)
constitutes an upper bound on consumption in the presence of uncertainty, since
23Throughout the remaining analysis I make a ﬁnal assumption that is not strictly justiﬁed by the foregoing. We
have seen that the ﬁnite-horizon consumption functions cT−n(m) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
concave, and that they converge to a continuous function c(m). It does not strictly follow that the limiting function
c(m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, but I will assume that it is.
24We will assume the RIC holds here and subsequently so that κ > 0; the situation is a bit more complex when
the RIC does not hold. In that case the bound on consumption is given by the spending that would be undertaken
by a consumer who faced binding liquidity constraints. Detailed analysis of this special case is not suﬃciently
interesting to warrant inclusion in the paper.
27Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that the introduction of uncertainty strictly de-
creases the level of consumption at any m.
Thus, we can write
c(m) < c(m) < ¯ c(m)
1 < c(m)/c(m) < ¯ c(m)/c(m).
But
lim
m→∞
¯ c(m)/c(m) = lim
m→∞
(m − 1+h)/m
=1 ,
so as m →∞ ,c(m)/c(m) → 1, and the continuous diﬀerentiability and strict
concavity of c(m) therefore implies
lim
m→∞c
 (m)=c
 (m)=¯ c
 (m)=κ
because any other ﬁxed limit would eventually lead to a level of consumption either
exceeding ¯ c(m) or lower than c(m).
Figure 4 conﬁrms these limits visually. The top plot shows the converged con-
sumption function along with its upper and lower bounds, while the lower plot shows
the marginal propensity to consume.
Next we establish the limit of the expected consumption growth factor as mt →∞ :
lim
mt→∞Et[c c ct+1/c c ct] = lim
mt→∞Et[Γt+1ct+1/ct].
But
Et[Γt+1ct+1/¯ ct] ≤ Et[Γt+1ct+1/ct] ≤ Et[Γt+1¯ ct+1/ct]
and
lim
mt→∞Γt+1c(mt+1)/¯ c(mt) = lim
mt→∞Γt+1¯ c(mt+1)/c(mt) = lim
mt→∞Γt+1mt+1/mt,
while
lim
mt→∞Γt+1mt+1/mt = lim
mt→∞
 
Ra(mt)+Γ t+1ξt+1
mt
 
=( Rβ)
1/ρ = Þ Þ Þ
because limmt→∞ a (m)=Þ Þ ÞR
25 and Γt+1ξt+1/mt ≤ (Γ ¯ ψ¯ θ/ ℘)/mt which goes to zero
as mt goes to inﬁnity.
Hence we have
Þ Þ Þ ≤ lim
mt→∞Et[c c ct+1/c c ct] ≤ Þ Þ Þ
25This is because limmt→∞ a(mt)/mt =1− limmt→∞ c(mt)/mt =1− limmt→∞ c (mt)=Þ Þ ÞR.
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29so as cash goes to inﬁnity, consumption growth approaches its value Þ Þ Þ in the perfect
foresight model.
This argument applies equally well to the problem of the restrained consumer,
because as m approaches inﬁnity the constraint becomes irrelevant (assuming the
FHWC holds).
3.2 Limits as mt → 0
Now consider the limits of behavior as mt gets arbitrarily small.
Equation (37) shows that the limiting value of ¯ κ is
¯ κ =1 − R
−1(℘Rβ)
1/ρ.
Deﬁning e(m)=c ( m)/m as before we have
lim
m↓0
e(m)=( 1 − ℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR)=¯ κ.
Now using the continuous diﬀerentiability of the consumption function along with
L’Hôpital’s rule, we have
lim
m↓0
c
 (m) = lim
m↓0
e(m)=¯ κ.
Figure 4 conﬁrms that the numerical solution method obtains this limit for the
MPC as m approaches zero.
For consumption growth, we have
lim
mt↓0
Et
  
c(mt+1)
c(mt)
 
Γt+1
 
> lim
mt↓0
Et
  
c(Rt+1a(mt)+ξt+1)
¯ κmt
 
Γt+1
 
= ℘ lim
mt↓0
Et
  
c(Rt+1a(mt))
¯ κmt
 
Γt+1
 
+ ℘ lim
mt↓0
Et
  
c(Rt+1a(mt)+θt+1/ ℘)
¯ κmt
 
Γt+1
 
>  ℘ lim
mt↓0
Et
  
c(θt+1/ ℘)
¯ κmt
 
Γt+1
 
= ∞
where the second-to-last line follows because limmt↓0 Et
  
c(Rt+1a(mt))
¯ κmt
 
Γt+1
 
is pos-
itive, and the last line follows because the minimum possible realization of θt+1
is θ>0 so the minimum possible value of expected next-period consumption is
positive.
26
26 The same arguments establish limm↓0 Et[c c ct+1/c c ct]=∞ for the problem of the restrained consumer.
303.3 There Exists Exactly One Target Cash-on-Hand Ratio, which is
Stable
Deﬁne the target cash-on-hand-to-income ratio ˇ m as the value of m such that
Et[mt+1/mt]=1if mt =ˇ m. (48)
where the ∨ accent is meant to invoke the fact that this is the value that other m’s
‘point to.’
We prove existence by arguing that Et[mt+1/mt] is continuous on mt > 0,a n d
takes on values both above and below 1, so that it must equal 1 somewhere by the
intermediate value theorem.
Speciﬁcally, the same logic used in section 3.2 shows that limmt↓0 Et[mt+1/mt]=
∞.
The limit as mt goes to inﬁnity is
lim
mt→∞Et[mt+1/mt] = lim
mt→∞Et
 
Rt+1a(mt)+ξt+1
mt
 
= Et[(R/Γt+1)Þ Þ ÞR]
= Et[Þ Þ Þ/Γt+1]
< 1
where the last line is guaranteed by our imposition of the GIC (29).
Stability means that in a local neighborhood of ˇ m, values of mt above ˇ m will result
in a smaller ratio of Et[mt+1/mt] than at ˇ m. That is, if mt > ˇ m then Et[mt+1/mt] <
1. This will be true if
 
d
dmt
 
Et[mt+1/mt] < 0
at mt =ˇ m.B u t
 
d
dmt
 
Et[mt+1/mt]=Et
  
d
dmt
 
[Rt+1(1 − c(mt)/mt)+ξt+1/mt]
 
= Et
 
Rt+1(c(mt) − c (mt)mt) − ξt+1
m2
t
 
which will be negative if its numerator is negative. Deﬁne ζ ζ ζ(mt) as the expectation
of the numerator,
ζ ζ ζ(mt)=Et[Rt+1]
      
≡ ¯ R
(c(mt) − c
 (mt)mt) − 1. (49)
The target level of market resources ˇ m satisﬁes
Et[mt+1]=Et[Rt+1(mt − ct)+ξt+1]
ˇ m = ¯ R(ˇ m − c(ˇ m)) + 1
31¯ Rc(ˇ m) = 1+(¯ R−1)ˇ m. (50)
At the target, equation (49)i s
ζ ζ ζ(ˇ m)= ¯ Rc(ˇ m) − ¯ Rc
 (ˇ m)ˇ m − 1.
Substituting for the ﬁrst term in this expression using (50) gives
ζ ζ ζ(ˇ m) = 1+(¯ R−1)ˇ m − ¯ Rc
 (ˇ m)ˇ m − 1
=ˇ m
  ¯ R−1 − ¯ Rc
 (ˇ m)
 
=ˇ m
  ¯ R(1 − c
 (ˇ m)) − 1
 
< ˇ m
  ¯ R(1 − (1 − R
−1(Rβ)
1/ρ)) − 1
 
=ˇ m
  ¯ RÞ Þ ÞR − 1
 
=ˇ m
⎛
⎜
⎝Et[Þ Þ Þ/Γt+1]
      
<1 from (29)
−1
⎞
⎟
⎠
< 0
where the step introducing the inequality imposes the fact that c  > Þ Þ ÞR which is an
implication of the concavity of the consumption function.
We have now proven that some target ˇ m must exist, and that at any such ˇ m the
solution is stable. Nothing so far, however, rules out the possibility that there will
be multiple values of m that satisfy the deﬁnition (48) of a target.
Multiple targets can be ruled out as follows. Suppose there exist multiple targets;
these can be arranged in ascending order and indexed by an integer superscript, so
that the target with the smallest value is, e.g., ˇ m1. The argument just completed
implies that since Et[mt+1/mt] is continuously diﬀerentiable there must exist some
small   such that Et[mt+1/mt] < 1 for mt =ˇ m1 + . (Continuous diﬀerentiability of
Et[mt+1/mt] follows from the continuous diﬀerentiability of c(mt).)
Now assume there exists a second value of m satisfying the deﬁnition of a target,
ˇ m2. Since Et[mt+1/mt] is continuous, it must be approaching 1 from below as
mt → ˇ m2, since by the intermediate value theorem it could not have gone above 1
between ˇ m1 +   and ˇ m2 without passing through 1, and by the deﬁnition of ˇ m2 it
cannot have passed through 1 before reaching ˇ m2. But saying that Et[mt+1/mt] is
approaching 1 from below as mt → ˇ m2 implies that
 
d
dmt
 
Et[mt+1/mt] > 0 (51)
at mt =ˇ m2. However, we just showed above that, under our assumption that the
GIC holds, precisely the opposite of equation (51) must hold for any m that satisﬁes
the deﬁnition of a target. Thus, assuming the existence of more than one target
implies a contradiction.
32The foregoing arguments rely on the continuous diﬀerentiability of c(m),s ot h e
arguments do not directly go through for the restrained consumer’s problem in which
the existence of liquidity constraints can lead to discrete changes in the slope c (m)
at particular values of m. But we can use the fact that the restrained model is the
limit of the baseline model as ℘ ↓ 0 to conclude that there is likely a unique target
cash level even in the restrained model.
If consumers are suﬃciently impatient, the limiting target level in the restrained
model will be ˇ m = Et[ξt+1]=1 . That is, if a consumer starting with m =1will
save nothing, a(1) = 0, then the target level of m in the restrained model will be 1;
if a consumer with m =1would choose to save something, then the target level of
cash-on-hand will be greater than the expected level of income.
3.4 Expected Consumption Growth at Target m Is Less than
Expected Permanent Income Growth
In Figure 3 the intersection of the target cash-on-hand ratio locus at ˇ m with the
expected consumption growth curve lies below the intersection with the horizontal
line representing the growth rate of expected permanent income. This can be proven
as follows.
Strict concavity of the consumption function implies that if Et[mt+1]=ˇ m = mt
then
Et
 
Γt+1c(mt+1)
c(mt)
 
< Et
  
Γt+1(c(ˇ m)+c  (ˇ m)(mt+1 − ˇ m))
c(ˇ m)
  
= Et
 
Γt+1
 
1+
 
c (ˇ m)
c(ˇ m)
 
(mt+1 − ˇ m)
  
=Γ +
 
c (ˇ m)
c(ˇ m)
 
Et [Γt+1 (mt+1 − ˇ m)]
=Γ +
 
c (ˇ m)
c(ˇ m)
 
⎡
⎣Et[Γt+1]Et[mt+1 − ˇ m]
      
=0
+covt(Γt+1,m t+1)
⎤
⎦ (52)
and since mt+1 =( R/Γt+1)a(ˇ m)+ξt+1 and a(ˇ m) > 0 it is clear that
covt(Γt+1,m t+1) < 0 which implies that the entire term added to Γ in (52)
is negative, as required.
333.5 Expected Consumption Growth Is a Declining Function of mt (or
Is It?)
Figure 3 depicts the expected consumption growth factor as a strictly declining
function of the cash-on-hand ratio. To investigate this, deﬁne
Υ Υ Υ(mt) ≡ Γt+1c(Rt+1a(mt)+ξt+1)/c(mt)=c c ct+1/c c ct
and the proposition in which we are interested is
(d/dmt)Et[Υ Υ Υ(mt)
      
≡Υ Υ Υt+1
] < 0
or diﬀerentiating through the expectations operator, what we want is
Et
 
Γt+1
 
c (mt+1)Rt+1a (mt)c(mt) − c(mt+1)c (mt)
c(mt)2
  
< 0. (53)
Henceforth indicating appropriate arguments by the corresponding subscript (e.g.
c 
t+1 ≡ c (mt+1)), since Γt+1Rt+1 = R, the portion of the LHS of equation (53)i n
brackets can be manipulated to yield
ctΥ Υ Υ
 
t+1 =c
 
t+1a
 
tR − c
 
tΓt+1ct+1/ct
=c
 
t+1a
 
tR − c
 
tΥ Υ Υt+1. (54)
Now diﬀerentiate the Euler equation with respect to mt:
1=Rβ Et[Υ Υ Υ
−ρ
t+1]
0=Et[Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 Υ Υ Υ
 
t+1]
= Et[Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ]Et[Υ Υ Υ
 
t+1]+covt(Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ,Υ Υ Υ
 
t+1)
Et[Υ Υ Υ
 
t+1]=−covt(Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ,Υ Υ Υ
 
t+1)/Et[Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ] (55)
but since Υ Υ Υt+1 > 0 we can see from (55)t h a t( 53) is equivalent to
covt(Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ,Υ Υ Υ
 
t+1) > 0
which, using (54), will be true if
covt(Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ,c
 
t+1a
 
tR − c
 
tΥ Υ Υt+1) > 0
which in turn will be true if both
covt(Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ,c
 
t+1) > 0
and
covt(Υ Υ Υ
−ρ−1
t+1 ,Υ Υ Υt+1) < 0.
The latter proposition is obviously true under our assumption ρ>1. The former
34will be true if
covt
 
(Γψt+1c(mt+1))
−ρ−1,c
 (mt+1)
 
> 0.
The two shocks cause two kinds of variation in mt+1. Variations due to ξt+1 satisfy
the proposition, since a higher draw of ξ both reduces c
−ρ−1
t+1 and reduces the marginal
propensity to consume. However, permanent shocks have conﬂicting eﬀects. On the
one hand, a higher draw of ψt+1 will reduce mt+1, thus increasing both c
−ρ−1
t+1 and
c 
t+1. On the other hand, the c
−ρ−1
t+1 term is multiplied by Γψt+1, so the eﬀect of
a higher ψt+1 could be to decrease the ﬁrst term in the covariance, leading to a
negative covariance with the second term. (Analogously, a lower permanent shock
ψt+1 can also lead a negative correlation.)
4 The Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Relationship
Between Consumption Growth and Income
Growth
This section examines the behavior of large collections of buﬀer-stock consumers
with identical parameter values. Such a collection can be thought of as either a
subset of the population within a single country (say, members of a given education
or occupation group), or as the whole population in a small open economy. We
will continue to take the aggregate interest rate as exogenous and constant. It
is also possible, and only slightly more diﬃcult, to solve for the steady-state of a
closed-economy version of the model where the interest rate is endogenous.
Formally, we assume a continuum of ex ante identical households on the unit
interval, with constant total mass normalized to one and indexed by i ∈ [0,1], all
behaving according to the model speciﬁed above.
27
4.1 Convergence of the Cross-Section Distribution
Szeidl (2006) proves that such a population will be characterized by an invariant
distribution of m that induces invariant distributions for c and a; designate these
Fm, Fa,a n dFc.
28
27One inconvenient aspect of the model as speciﬁed is that it does not exhibit a stationary distribution of
idiosyncratic permanent noncapital income; the longer the economy lasts, the wider is the distribution. This
problem can be remedied by assuming a constant probability of death, and replacing deceased households with
newborns whose initial idiosyncratic permanent income matches the mean idiosyncratic permanent income of the
population. For a fully worked-out general equilibrium version of such a model, see Carroll and Tokuoka (2011).
28Szeidl’s proof supplants simulation evidence of ergodicity that appeared in an earlier version of this paper.
35Szeidl’s proof, however, does not yield any sense of how quickly convergence
occurs, which in principle depends on all of the parameters of the model as well
as the initial conditions. To build intuition, Figure 5 supplies an example in which
a population begins with a particularly simple distribution that is far from the
invariant one:
m1,i = ξ1,i,
which would characterize a population in which all assets had been wiped out
immediately before the receipt of period 1’s noncapital income.
29
The ﬁgure plots the distributions of a (for technical reasons, this is slightly better
than plotting m) at the ends of 1, 4, 10, and 40 periods.
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Figure 5 Convergence of Fa to Invariant Distribution
The ﬁgure illustrates the fact that, under these parameter values, convergence to
the invariant distribution has largely been accomplished within 10 periods. By 40
periods, the distribution is indistinguishable from the invariant distribution.
29We assume that logψt+1 and logξt+1 are normally distributed with means −σ2
ψ/2 and −σ2
ξ/2 and variances
σ2
ψ and σ2
ξ (so that M[ψt+1]=M[ξt+1]=1 ), where M[] is the mean operator deﬁned below.
30The ﬁgure reﬂects results for the calibration detailed in Table 1, which are representative of the micro literature
which has mainly focused on matching behavior of median or “typical” households, who hold little liquid wealth. A
higher time preference factor would be necessary to match the behavior of richer households who hold much of the
aggregate capital stock. However, for these richer households, the precautionary motives highlighted in this model
may be less relevant than other motives which are less well understood.
364.2 Consumption and Income Growth at the Household Level
It is useful to deﬁne the operator M[•] which yields the mean value of its argument
in the population, as distinct from the expectations operator E[•] which represents
beliefs about the future.
An economist with a microeconomic dataset could calculate the average growth
rate of idiosyncratic consumption, and would ﬁnd
M[Δlogc c ct+1]=M[logct+1p p pt+1 − logctp p pt]
= M[logp p pt+1 − logp p pt +l o gct+1 − logct]
= M[logp p pt+1 − logp p pt]+M[logct+1 − logct]
= γ − σ
2
ψ/2,
where γ =l o gΓand the last equality follows because the invariance of Fc means
that M[logct+1]=M[logct].
31
4.3 Growth Rates of Aggregate Income and Consumption
Attanasio and Weber (1995) point out that concavity of the consumption function
(or other nonlinearities) can imply that it is quantitatively important to distinguish
between the growth rate of average consumption and the average growth rate of
consumption.
32 We have just examined the average growth rate; we now examine
the growth rate of the average.
Using capital letters for aggregate variables, the growth factor for aggregate
income is given by:
Y Y Y t+1/Y Y Y t = M[ξt+1Γψt+1p p pt]/M[p p ptξt]
=Γ
because of the independence assumptions we have made about ξ and ψ.
Aggregate assets are:
A A At = M[at,ip p pt,i]
= APt + covt(at,i,p p pt,i)
where Pt designates the mean level of permanent income across all individuals, and
we are assuming that at,i was distributed according to the invariant distribution
with a mean value of A. Since permanent income grows at mean rate Γ while the
distribution of a is invariant, if we normalize Pt to one we will similarly have for
31Papers in the simulation literature have observed an approximate equivalence between the average growth
rates of idiosyncratic consumption and permanent income, but formal proof was not possible until Szeidl’s proof of
ergodicity.
32Since we assume number of the households are normalized to 1, aggregate and average variables are identical.
37any period n ≥ 1
A A At+n = AΓ
n + cov(at+n,i,p p pt+n,i).
Unfortunately, Szeidl (2006)’s proof of the invariance of Fa does not yield the in-
formation about how the cross-sectional covariance between a and p p p evolves required
to show that the covariance term grows by a factor smaller than Γ; if that were true,
its relative size would shrink to zero over time. (A proof that the covariance shrinks
fast enough would mean that the term could be neglected).
The desired result can be proven if there are no permanent shocks; see appendix
E for that proof, along with a discussion of the characteristics of a covariance term
that prevents proof in the general case with both transitory and permanent shocks.
A wide range of simulation experiments conﬁrms that the role of that covariance
term is more an irritating theoretical curiosum than an important practical consider-
ation. An example is given in Figure 6, which plots C C Ct+1/C C Ct for the economy whose
converging CDFs were depicted in Figure 5. After the 40 periods of simulation that
generated CDFs plotted in 5, we conduct an experiment designed to ﬂush out the
role of the annoying covariance term: We reset the level of permanent income to be
identical for all consumers (‘the revolution’):
p p p41,i =Γ P40 ∀ i
and we redistribute cash among consumers in such a way as to leave each consumer
with the same value of a41,i that they would have had in the absence of the revolution.
This leaves us with the same distribution of a as before the revolution, but no
covariance between a and p p p.
The eﬀect on aggregate consumption growth of even such an extreme revolution in
covariance is small, and dissipates immediately (no eﬀect is visible after the period
of revolution itself). This experiment is representative of many that suggest that the
practical eﬀects of time-variaton in the covariance between a and p p p are negligible.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical foundations for many characteristics of buﬀer stock
saving models that have heretofore been observed in simulations but not proven.
Perhaps the most important such proposition is the existence of a target cash-to-
permanent-income ratio toward which actual cash will tend.
Another contribution is provision a set of tools for numerical solution and simula-
tion (available on the author’s web page) that conﬁrm and illustrate the theoretical
propositions. These programs demonstrate how the incorporation of the paper’s
theoretical results can make numerical solution algorithms more eﬃcient and sim-
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Figure 6 Consumption Growth in Simulated Economy with Γ=1 .03
pler. A goal of the paper has been to make these tools accessible and easy to use
while incorporating the full rigor of the theoretical results in the structure.
39Appendices
A Perfect Foresight Liquidity Constrained Solution
This appendix taxonomizes the characteristics of the limiting consumption function
˚ c(m) under perfect foresight in the presence of a liquidity constraint requiring b ≥ 0
under various conditions. Results are summarized in table 4.
A.1 If PF-GIC Fails
A consumer is ‘growth patient’ if the perfect foresight growth impatience condition
fails (  PF-GIC, 1 < Þ Þ Þ/Γ). Under   PF-GIC the constraint does not bind at the lowest
feasible value of mt =1because 1 < (Rβ)1/ρ/Γ implies that spending everything
today (setting ct = mt =1 ) produces lower marginal utility than is obtainable by
reallocating a marginal unit of resources to the next period at return R:
33
1 < (Rβ)
1/ρΓ
−1 (56)
1 < RβΓ
−ρ (57)
u
 (1) < Rβu
 (Γ). (58)
Similar logic shows that under these circumstances the constraint will never
bind for an unconstrained consumer with a ﬁnite horizon of n periods, so such
a consumer’s consumption function will be the same as for the unconstrained case
examined in the main text.
If the RIC fails (1 < Þ Þ ÞR) while the ﬁnite human wealth condition holds, the
limiting value of this consumption function as n ↑∞is the degenerate function
˚ cT−n(m)=0 ( bt + h). (59)
If the RIC fails and the FHWC fails, human wealth limits to h = ∞ so the
consumption function limits to either ˚ cT−n(m)=0or ˚ cT−n(m)=∞ depending
on the relative speeds with which the MPC approaches zero and human wealth
approaches ∞.
34
Thus, the requirement that the consumption function be nondegenerate implies
that for a consumer satisfying  PF-GIC we must impose the RIC (and the FHWC can
be shown to be a consequence of   PF-GIC and RIC). In this case, the consumer’s
optimal behavior is easy to describe. We can calculate the point at which the
33The point at which the constraint would bind (if that point could be attained) is the m = c for which u (c#)=
Rβu (Γ) which is c# =Γ /(Rβ)1/ρ and the consumption function will be deﬁned by˚ c(m)=m i n [ m,c# +(m−c#)κ].
34The knife-edge case is where Þ Þ Þ =Γ , in which case the two quantites counterbalance and the limiting function
is˚ c(m)=m i n [ m,1].
40unconstrained consumer would choose c = m from (19):
m# =( m# − 1+h)κ (60)
m#(1 − κ)=( h − 1)κ (61)
m# =( h − 1)
 
κ
1 − κ
 
(62)
which (under these assumptions) satisﬁes 0 <m # < 1.
35 For m<m # the
unconstrained consumer would choose to consume more than m; for such m,t h e
constrained consumer is obliged to choose ˚ c(m)=m.
36 For any m>m # the
constraint will never bind and the consumer will choose to spend the same amount
as the unconstrained consumer, ¯ c(m).
A.2 If PF-GIC Holds
Imposition of the PF-GIC reverses the inequality in (56)-(58), and thus reverses
the conclusion: A consumer who starts with mt =1will desire to consume more
than 1. Such a consumer will be constrained, not only in period t, but perpetually
thereafter.
Now deﬁne bn
# as the bt such that an unconstrained consumer holding bt = bn
#
would behave so as to arrive in period t+n with bt+n =0(with b0
# trivially equal to
0); for example, a consumer with bt−1 = b1
# was on the ‘cusp’ of being constrained
in period t − 1:H a dbt−1 been inﬁnitesimally smaller, the constraint would have
been binding (because the consumer would have desired, but been unable, to enter
period t with negative, not zero, b). Given the PF-GIC, the constraint certainly
binds in period t (and thereafter) with resources of mt = m0
# =1+b0
# =1 :T h e
consumer cannot spend more (because constrained), and will not choose to spend
less (because impatient), than ct = c0
# =1 .
We can construct the entire ‘prehistory’ of this consumer leading up to t as follows.
Maintaining the assumption that the constraint has never bound in the past, c must
have been growing according to Þ Þ ÞΓ, so consumption n periods in the past must have
been
c
n
# = Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ ct = Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ . (63)
The PDV of consumption from t − n until t can thus be computed as
C
t
t−n = ct−n(1 +Þ Þ Þ/R + ... +( Þ Þ Þ/R)
n)
= c
n
#(1 +Þ Þ ÞR + ... +Þ Þ Þ
n
R)
35Note that 0 <m # is implied by RIC and m# < 1 is implied by  PF-GIC.
36As an illustration, consider a consumer for whom Þ Þ Þ =1 , R =1 .01 and Γ=0 .99. This consumer will save the
amount necessary to ensure that growth in market wealth exactly oﬀsets the decline in human wealth represented
by Γ < 1; total wealth (and therefore total consumption) will remain constant, even as market wealth and human
wealth trend in opposite directions.
41= Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ
 
1 −Þ Þ Þ
n+1
R
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
 
(64)
and note that the consumer’s human wealth between t−n and t (the relevant time
horizon, because from t onward the consumer will be constrained and unable to
access post-t income) is
h
n
# =1 + ... + R
−n (65)
while the intertemporal budget constraint says
C
t
t−n = b
n
# + h
n
#
from which we can solve for the bn
# such that the consumer with bt−n = bn
# would
unconstrainedly plan (in period t − n) to arrive in period t with bt =0 :
b
n
# = C
t
t−n −
hn
#         
1 −R −(n+1)
1 −R −1
 
. (66)
Deﬁning mn
# = bn
# +1 , consider the function˚ c(m) deﬁned by linearly connecting
the points {mn
#,c n
#} for integer values of n ≥ 0 (and setting˚ c(m)=m for m<1).
This function will return, for any value of m, the optimal value of c for a liquidity
constrained consumer with an inﬁnite horizon. The function is piecewise linear with
‘kink points’ where the slope discretely changes, because for inﬁnitesimal   the MPC
of a consumer with assets m = mn
#−  is discretely higher than for a consumer with
assets m = mn
# +   because the latter consumer will spread a marginal dollar over
more periods before exhausting it.
In order for a unique consumption function to be deﬁned by this sequence (66)
for the entire domain of positive real values of b, we need bn
# to become arbitrarily
large with n. That is, we need
lim
n→∞b
n
# = ∞. (67)
A.2.1 If FHWC Holds
The FHWC requires R−1 < 1, in which case the second term in (66) limits to a
constant as n ↑∞ ,a n d( 67) reduces to a requirement that
lim
n→∞
 
Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ − (Þ Þ ÞR/Þ Þ ÞΓ)nÞ Þ ÞR
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
 
= ∞
lim
n→∞
 
Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ −R −nÞ Þ ÞR
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
 
= ∞
lim
n→∞
 
Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
 
= ∞.
42Given the PF-GIC Þ Þ Þ
−1
Γ > 1, this will hold iﬀ the RIC holds, Þ Þ ÞR < 1. But given that
the FHWC R > Γ holds, the PF-GIC is stronger (harder to satisfy) than the RIC;
thus, FHWC and the PF-GIC together imply the RIC, and so a well-deﬁned solution
exists. Furthermore, in the limit as n approaches inﬁnity, the diﬀerence between
the limiting constrained consumption function and the unconstrained consumption
function becomes vanishingly small, because as the date at which the constraint
binds becomes arbitrarily distant, the eﬀect of that constraint on current behavior
shrinks to nothing. That is,
lim
m→∞˚ c(m) −¯ c(m)=0 . (68)
A.2.2 If FHWC Fails
If the FHWC fails, matters are a bit more complex. Given failure of FHWC, (67)
requires
lim
n→∞
 
R−nÞ Þ ÞR −Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ
Þ Þ ÞR − 1
 
+
 
1 −R −(n+1)
R−1 − 1
 
= ∞
lim
n→∞
 
Þ Þ ÞR
Þ Þ ÞR − 1
−
R−1
R−1 − 1
 
R
−n −
 
Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ
Þ Þ ÞR − 1
 
= ∞
lim
n→∞
 
Þ Þ ÞR(R−1 − 1)
(R−1 − 1)(Þ Þ ÞR − 1)
−
R−1(Þ Þ ÞR − 1)
(R−1 − 1)(Þ Þ ÞR − 1)
 
R
−n −
 
Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ
Þ Þ ÞR − 1
 
= ∞. (69)
If RIC Holds. When the RIC holds, rearranging (69) gives
lim
n→∞
 
Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
 
−R
−n
 
Þ Þ ÞR
1 −Þ Þ ÞR
+
R−1
R−1 − 1
 
= ∞
and for this to be true we need
Þ Þ Þ
−1
Γ > R
−1
Γ/Þ Þ Þ > Γ/R
1 > Þ Þ Þ/R
which is merely the RIC again. So the problem has a solution if the RIC holds.
Indeed, we can even calculate the limiting MPC from
lim
n→∞κ
n
# = lim
n→∞
 
cn
#
bn
#
 
(70)
43which with a few lines of algebra can be shown to asymptote to the MPC in the
perfect foresight model:
37
lim
m→∞
˚ κ κ κ(m)=1 −Þ Þ ÞR. (71)
If RIC Fails. Consider now the   RIC case, Þ Þ ÞR > 1. In this case the constant
multiplying R−n in (69) will be positive if
Þ Þ ÞRR
−1 −Þ Þ ÞR > R
−1Þ Þ ÞR −R
−1
R
−1 > Þ Þ ÞR
Γ > Þ Þ Þ
which is merely the PF-GIC which we are maintaining. So the ﬁrst term’s limit is
+∞. The combined limit will be +∞ if the term involving R−n goes to +∞ faster
than the term involving −Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ goes to −∞; that is, if
R
−1 > Þ Þ Þ
−1
Γ
Γ/R > Γ/Þ Þ Þ
Þ Þ Þ/R > 1
which merely conﬁrms the starting assumption that the RIC fails. Thus, surpris-
ingly, the problem has a well deﬁned solution with inﬁnite human wealth if the RIC
fails. It remains true that   RIC implies a limiting MPC of zero,
lim
m→∞
˚ κ κ κ(m)=0 , (72)
but that limit is approached gradually, starting from a positive value, and conse-
quently the consumption function is not the degenerate˚ c(m)=0 . (Figure 7 presents
an example for ρ =2 , R =0 .98, β =0 .99, Γ=1 .0).
We can summarize as follows. Given that the PF-GIC holds, the interesting
question is whether the FHWC holds. If so, the RIC automatically holds, and the
solution limits into the solution to the unconstrained problem as m ↑∞ . But even
if the FHWC fails, the problem has a well-deﬁned solution, whether or not the RIC
holds.
B Existence of a Concave Consumption Function
To show that (6) deﬁnes a sequence of continuously diﬀerentiable strictly increasing
concave functions {cT,cT−1,...,cT−k}, we start with a deﬁnition. We will say that a
function n(z) is ‘nice’ if it satisﬁes
1. n(z) is well-deﬁned iﬀ z>0
37For an example of this conﬁguration of parameters, see the notebook doApndxLiqConstr.nb in the software
archive.
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2. n(z) is strictly increasing
3. n(z) is strictly concave
4. n(z) is C3 (its ﬁrst three derivatives exist)
5. n(z) < 0
6. limz↓0 n(z)=−∞.
(Notice that an implication of niceness is that limz↓0 n (z)=∞.)
Assume that some vt+1 is nice. Our objective is to show that this implies vt is
also nice; this is suﬃcient to establish that vt−n is nice by induction for all n>0
because vT(m)=u ( m) and u(m)=m1−ρ/(1 − ρ) is nice by inspection.
Now deﬁne an end-of-period value function vt(a) as
vt(a)=β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1vt+1(Rt+1a + ξt+1)
 
. (73)
Since there is a positive probability that ξt+1 will attain its minimum of zero and
since Rt+1 > 0, it is clear that lima↓0 vt(a)=−∞ and lima↓0 v 
t(a)=∞.S ovt(a)
is well-deﬁned iﬀ a>0; it is similarly straightforward to show the other properties
required for vt(a) to be nice. (See Hiraguchi (2003).)
Next deﬁne vt(m,c) as
vt(m,c)=u ( c)+vt(m − c) (74)
45which is C3 since vt and u are both C3, and note that our problem’s value function
deﬁned in (6) can be written as
vt(m)=m a x
c vt(m,c). (75)
vt is well-deﬁned if and only if 0 <c<m . Furthermore, limc↓0 vt(m,c)=
limc↑m vt(m,c)=−∞,
∂2vt(m,c)
∂c2 < 0, limc↓0
∂vt(m,c)
∂c =+ ∞,a n dlimc↑m
∂vt(m,c)
∂c = −∞.
It follows that the ct(m) deﬁned by
ct(m) = argmax
0<c<m
vt(m,c) (76)
exists and is unique, and (6) has an internal solution that satisﬁes
u
 (ct(m)) = v
 
t(m − ct(m)). (77)
Since both u and vt are strictly concave, both ct(m) and at(m)=m − ct(m) are
strictly increasing. Since both u and vt are three times continuously diﬀerentiable,
using (77) we can conclude that ct(m) is continuously diﬀerentiable and
c
 
t(m)=
v  
t(at(m))
u  (ct(m)) + v  
t(at(m))
. (78)
Similarly we can easily show that ct(m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
(as is at(m)) (See Appendix C.) This implies that vt(m) is nice, since
vt(m) = u(ct(m)) + vt(at(m)).
C ct(m) is Twice Continuously Diﬀerentiable
First we show that ct(m) is C1. Deﬁne y as y ≡ m+dm. Since u  (ct(y))−u  (ct(m)) =
v 
t(at(y)) − v 
t(at(m)) and
at(y)−at(m)
dm =1−
ct(y)−ct(m)
dm ,
v 
t(at(y)) − v 
t(at(m))
at(y) − at(m)
=
 
u  (ct(y)) − u  (ct(m))
ct(y) − ct(m)
+
v 
t(at(y)) − v 
t(at(m))
at(y) − at(m)
 
ct(y) − ct(m)
dm
Since ct and at are continuous and increasing, lim
dm→+0
u (ct(y))−u (ct(m))
ct(y)−ct(m) < 0 and
lim
dm→+0
v 
t(at(y))−v 
t(at(m))
at(y)−at(m) < 0 are satisﬁed. Then
u (ct(y))−u (ct(m))
ct(y)−ct(m) +
v 
t(at(y))−v 
t(at(m))
at(y)−at(m) < 0
for suﬃciently small dm. Hence we obtain a well-deﬁned equation:
ct(y) − ct(m)
dm
=
v 
t(at(y))−v 
t(at(m))
at(y)−at(m)
u (ct(y))−u (ct(m))
ct(y)−ct(m) +
v 
t(at(y))−v 
t(at(m))
at(y)−at(m)
.
46This implies that the right-derivative, c
 +
t (m) is well-deﬁned and
c
 +
t (m)=
v  
t(at(m))
u  (ct(m)) + v  
t(at(m))
.
Similarly we can show that c
 +
t (m)=c
 −
t (m), which means c 
t(m) exists. Since vt
is C3, c 
t(m) exists and is continuous. c 
t(m) is diﬀerentiable because v  
t is C1, ct(m)
is C1 and u  (ct(m)) + v  
t (at(m)) < 0. c  
t(m) is given by
c
  
t(m)=
a 
t(m)v   
t (at)[u   (ct)+v  
t(at)] − v  
t(at)[c 
tu   (ct)+a 
tv   
t (at)]
[u  (ct)+v  
t(at)]
2 . (79)
Since v  
t(at(m)) is continuous, c  
t(m) is also continuous.
D Proof that T Is a Contraction Mapping
We must show that our operator T satisﬁes all of Boyd’s conditions.
Boyd’s operator T maps from C (A,B) to C(A,B). A preliminary requirement is
therefore that {Tz} be continuous for any  −bounded z, {Tz}∈ C (R++,R).T h i s
is not diﬃcult to show; see Hiraguchi (2003).
Consider condition 1). For this problem,
{Tx}(mt) is max
ct∈[κmt,¯ κmt]
 
u(ct)+β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1x(mt+1)
  
{Ty}(mt) is max
ct∈[κmt,¯ κmt]
 
u(ct)+β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1y(mt+1)
  
,
so x(•) ≤ y(•) implies {Tx}(mt) ≤{ Ty}(mt) by inspection.
38
Condition 2) requires that {T0}∈C   (A,B). By deﬁnition,
{T0}(mt)= m a x
ct∈[κmt,¯ κmt]
  
c
1−ρ
t
1 − ρ
 
+ β0
 
the solution to which is patently u(¯ κmt). Thus, condition 2) will hold if (¯ κmt)1−ρ
is  -bounded. We use the bounding function
 (m)=η + m
1−ρ, (80)
for some real scalar η>0 whose value will be determined in the course of the proof.
Under this deﬁnition of  , {T0}(mt) = u(¯ κmt) is clearly  -bounded.
Finally, we turn to condition 3), {T(z + ζ )}(mt) ≤{ Tz}(mt)+ζξ (mt). The
proof will be more compact if we deﬁne ˘ c and ˘ a as the consumption and assets func-
tions
39 associated with Tz and ˆ c and ˆ a as the functions associated with T(z + ζ );
38For a ﬁxed mt, recall that mt+1 is just a function of ct and the stochastic shocks.
39Section 2.7 proves existence of a continuously diﬀerentiable consumption function, which implies the existence
of a corresponding continuously diﬀerentiable assets function.
47using this notation, condition 3) can be rewritten
u(ˆ c) + β{E(z + ζ )}(ˆ a) ≤ u(˘ c) + β{Ez}(˘ a) + ζξ .
Now note that if we force the   consumer to consume the amount that is optimal
for the ∧ consumer, value for the   consumer must decline (at least weakly). That
is,
u(ˆ c) + β{Ez}(ˆ a) ≤ u(˘ c) + β{Ez}(˘ a).
Thus, condition 3) will certainly hold under the stronger condition
u(ˆ c) + β{E(z + ζ )}(ˆ a) ≤ u(ˆ c) + β{Ez}(ˆ a) + ζξ 
β{E(z + ζ )}(ˆ a) ≤ β{Ez}(ˆ a) + ζξ 
βζ{E }(ˆ a) ≤ ζξ 
β{E }(ˆ a) ≤ ξ 
β{E }(ˆ a) <  .
Using  (m)=η + m1−ρ and deﬁning ˆ at =ˆ a(mt), this condition is
β Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1(ˆ atRt+1 + ξt+1)
1−ρ] − m
1−ρ
t <η (1 − β Et Γ
1−ρ
t+1       
= 
)
which by imposing the PF-FVAC (24)   < 1 can be rewritten as:
η>
β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1(ˆ atRt+1 + ξt+1)1−ρ 
− m
1−ρ
t
1 −  
. (81)
But since η is an arbitrary constant that we can pick, the proof thus reduces to
showing that the numerator of (81) is bounded from above:
 ℘β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1(ˆ atRt+1 + θt+1/ ℘)
1−ρ 
+ ℘β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1(ˆ atRt+1)
1−ρ 
− m
1−ρ
t
≤  ℘β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1((1 − ¯ κ)mtRt+1 + θt+1/ ℘)
1−ρ 
+ ℘βR
1−ρ((1 − ¯ κ)mt)
1−ρ − m
1−ρ
t
=  ℘β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1((1 − ¯ κ)mtRt+1 + θt+1/ ℘)
1−ρ 
+ m
1−ρ
t
 
℘βR
1−ρ
 
℘
1/ρ(Rβ)1/ρ
R
 1−ρ
− 1
 
=  ℘β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1((1 − ¯ κ)mtRt+1 + θt+1/ ℘)
1−ρ 
+ m
1−ρ
t
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝℘
1/ρ(Rβ)1/ρ
R       
<1 by WRIC
−1
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ (82)
<  ℘β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1(θ/ ℘)
1−ρ 
=   ℘
ρθ
1−ρ.
We can thus conclude that equation (81) will certainly hold for any:
η>η =
  ℘ρθ1−ρ
1 −  
(83)
which is a positive ﬁnite number under our assumptions.
48The proof that T deﬁnes a contraction mapping under the conditions (36)a n d
(30) is now complete.
D.1 T and v
In deﬁning our operator T we made the restriction κmt ≤ ct ≤ ¯ κmt. However,
in the discussion of the consumption function bounds, we showed only (in (39))
that κtmt ≤ ct(mt) ≤ ¯ κtmt. (The diﬀerence is in the presence or absence of time
subscripts on the MPC’s.) We have therefore not proven (yet) that the sequence of
value functions (6) deﬁnes a contraction mapping.
Fortunately, the proof of that proposition is identical to the proof in 2.9, except
that we must replace ¯ κ with ¯ κT−1 and the WRIC must be replaced by a stronger
condition. The place where these conditions have force is in the step at (82).
Consideration of the prior two equations reveals that a suﬃcient stronger condition
is
℘β(R(1 − ¯ κT−1))
1−ρ < 1
(℘β)
1/(1−ρ)(1 − ¯ κT−1) < 1
(℘β)
1/(1−ρ)(1 − (1 + ℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR)
−1) < 1
where we have used (35) for ¯ κT−1. For small values of ℘ this expression can be
further simpliﬁed using (1 + ℘1/ρÞ Þ ÞR)−1 ≈ 1 − ℘1/ρÞ Þ ÞR so that it becomes
(℘β)
1/(1−ρ)℘
1/ρÞ Þ ÞR < 1
(℘β)℘
(1−ρ)/ρÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ
R < 1
β℘
1/ρÞ Þ Þ
1−ρ
R < 1
which for small values of ℘ is plainly easy to satisfy.
The upshot is that under these slightly stronger conditions the value functions for
the original problem deﬁne a contraction mapping with a unique v(m). But since
limn→∞ κT−n = κ and limn→∞ ¯ κT−n =¯ κ, it must be the case that the v(m) toward
which these vT−n’s are converging is the same v(m) that was the endpoint of the
contraction deﬁned by our operator T. Thus, under our slightly stronger (but still
quite weak) conditions, not only do the value functions deﬁned by (6) converge, they
converge to the same unique v deﬁned by T.
40
D.2 Convergence of vt in Euclidian Space
Boyd’s theorem shows that T deﬁnes a contraction mapping in a  -bounded space.
We now show that T also deﬁnes a contraction mapping in Euclidian space.
40It seems likely that convergence of the value functions for the original problem could be proven even if only
the WRIC were imposed; but that proof is not an essential part of the enterprise of this paper and is therefore left
for future work.
49Since v∗(m)=Tv∗(m),
 vT−n+1(m) − v
∗(m)   ≤ ξ
n−1  vT(m) − v
∗(m)   . (84)
On the other hand, vT − v∗ ∈C   (A,B) and κ =  vT(m) − v∗(m)   < ∞ because
vT and v∗ are in C  (A,B). It follows that
|vT−n+1(m) − v
∗(m)|≤κξ
n−1 | (m)|. (85)
Then we obtain
lim
n→∞vT−n+1(m)=v
∗(m). (86)
Since vT(m)=m1−ρ
1−ρ , vT−1(m) ≤
(¯ κm)1−ρ
1−ρ < vT(m). On the other hand, vT−1 ≤ vT
means TvT−1 ≤ TvT, in other words, vT−2(m) ≤ vT−1(m). Inductively one gets
vT−n(m) ≥ vT−n−1(m). This means that {vT−n+1(m)}
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence,
bounded below by v∗.
D.3 Convergence of ct
Given the proof that the value functions converge, we now show the pointwise
convergence of consumption functions {cT−n+1(m)}
∞
n=1.
We start by showing that
c(m) = argmax
ct∈[κm,¯ κm]
 
u(ct)+β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1v(mt+1)
  
(87)
is uniquely determined. We show this by contradiction. Suppose there exist c1 and
c2 that both attain the supremum for some m, with mean ˜ c =( c1+c2)/2. ci satisﬁes
Tv(m)=u ( ci)+β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1v(mt+1(m,ci))
 
      
≡v
(88)
where mt+1(m,ci)=( m − ci)Rt+1 + ξt+1 and i =1 ,2. Tv is concave for concave v.
Since the space of continuous and concave functions is closed, v is also concave and
satisﬁes
1
2
 
i=1,2
Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1v(mt+1(m,ci))
 
≤ Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1v(mt+1(m,˜ c))
 
. (89)
On the other hand, 1
2 {u(c1)+u ( c2)} < u(˜ c). Then one gets
Tv(m) < u(˜ c)+β Et
 
Γ
1−ρ
t+1v(mt+1(m,˜ c))
 
. (90)
Since ˜ c is a feasible choice for ci, the LHS of this equation cannot be a maximum,
which contradicts the deﬁnition.
Using uniqueness of c(m) we can now show
lim
n→∞cT−n+1(m)=c ( m). (91)
50Suppose this does not hold for some m = m∗. In this case, {cT−n+1(m∗)}
∞
n=1 has
a subsequence
 
cT−n(i)(m∗)
 ∞
i=1 that satisﬁes limi→∞ cT−n(i)(m∗)=c∗ and c∗  =
c(m∗). Now deﬁne c∗
T−n+1 =c T−n+1(m∗). c∗ > 0 because limi→∞ vT−n(i)+1(m∗) ≤
limi→∞ u(c∗
T−n(i)). Because a(m∗) > 0 and ψ ∈ [ψ, ¯ ψ] there exist {m∗
+, ¯ m∗
+} sat-
isfying 0 < m∗
+ < ¯ m∗
+ and mT−n+1(m∗,c ∗
T−n+1) ∈
 
m∗
+, ¯ m∗
+
 
. It follows that
limn→∞ vT−n+1(m)=v ( m) and the convergence is uniform on m ∈
 
m∗
+, ¯ m∗
+
 
.
(Uniform convergence is obtained from Dini’s theorem.
41) Hence for any δ>0,
there exists an n1 such that
β ET−n
 
Γ
1−ρ
T−n+1
 
 vT−n+1(mT−n+1(m
∗,c
∗
T−n+1)) − v(mT−n+1(m
∗,c
∗
T−n+1))
 
  
<δ
for all n ≥ n1. It follows that if we deﬁne
w(m
∗,z)=u ( z)+β ET−n
 
Γ
1−ρ
T−n+1v(mT−n+1(m
∗,z))
 
(92)
then vT−n(m∗) satisﬁes
lim
n→∞
 
 vT−n(m
∗) − w(m
∗,c
∗
T−n+1)
 
  =0 . (93)
On the other hand, there exists an i1 ∈ N such that
 
 v(mT−n(i)(m
∗,c
∗
T−n(i))) − v(mT−n(i)(m
∗,c
∗))
 
  ≤ δ for all i ≥ i1 (94)
because v is uniformly continuous on [m∗
+, ¯ m∗
+]. limi→∞
 
 cT−n(i)(m∗) − c∗ 
  =0and
 
 mT−n(i)(m
∗,c
∗
T−n(i)) − mT−n(i)(m
∗,c
∗)
 
  ≤
R
Γψ
 
 c
∗
T−n(i) − c
∗ 
 . (95)
This implies
lim
i→∞
 
 w(m
∗,c
∗
T−n(i)+1) − w(m
∗,c
∗)
 
  =0 . (96)
From (93)a n d( 96), we obtain limi→∞ vT−n(i)(m∗)=w ( m∗,c ∗) and this implies
w(m∗,c ∗)=v ( m∗). This implies that c(m) is not uniquely determined, which is a
contradiction.
Thus, the consumption functions must converge.
E Equality of Aggregate Consumption Growth and
Income Growth with Transitory Shocks
The text asserted that in the absence of permanent shocks it is possible to prove
that the growth factor for aggregate consumption approaches that for aggregate
permanent income. This section establishes that result.
41[Dini’s theorem] For a monotone sequence of continuous functions {vn(m)}∞
n=1 which is deﬁned on a compact
space and satisﬁes limn→∞ vn(m)=v ( m) where v(m) is continuous, convergence is uniform.
51Suppose the population starts in period t with an arbitrary value for
covt(at+1,i,p p pt+1,i).T h e n i f ˘ m is the invariant mean level of m we can deﬁne
a ‘mean MPS away from ˘ m’ function
´ a(Δ) = Δ
−1
  ˘ m+Δ
˘ m
a
 (z)dz
and since ψt+1,i =1 , Rt+1,i is a constant at R we can write
at+1,i =a ( ˘ m)+( mt+1,i − ˘ m)´ a(
mt+1,i       
Rat,i + ξt+1,i −˘ m)
so
covt(at+1,i,p p pt+1,i)=covt (´ a(Rat,i + ξt+1,i − ˘ m),Γp p pt,i).
But since R−1(℘Rβ)1/ρ < ´ a(m) < Þ Þ ÞR,
|covt((℘Rβ)
1/ρat+1,i,p p pt+1,i)| < |covt(at+1,i,p p pt+1,i)| < |covt(Þ Þ Þat+1,i,p p pt+1,i)|
and for the version of the model with no permanent shocks the GIC says that Þ Þ Þ < Γ,
which implies
|covt(at+1,i,p p pt+1,i)| < Γ|covt(at,i,p p pt,i)|.
This means that from any arbitrary starting value, the relative size of the covari-
ance term shrinks to zero over time (compared to the AΓn term which is growing
steadily by the factor Γ). Thus, limn→∞A A At+n+1/A A At+n =Γ .
This logic unfortunately does not go through when there are permanent shocks,
because the Rt+1,i terms are not independent of the permanent income shocks.
To see the problem clearly, deﬁne ˘ R = M[Rt+1,i] and consider a ﬁrst order Taylor
expansion of ´ a(mt+1,i) around ˇ mt+1,i = ˘ Rat,i +1 ,
´ at+1,i ≈ ´ a(ˇ mt+1,i)+´ a
 (ˇ mt+1,i)(mt+1,i − ˇ mt+1,i).
The problem comes from the ´ a  term. The concavity of the consumption function
implies convexity of the a function, so this term is strictly positive but we have no
theory to place bounds on its size as we do for its level ´ a. We cannot rule out by
theory that a positive shock to permanent income (which has a negative eﬀect on
mt+1,i) could have an unboundedly positive eﬀect on ´ a  (as for instance if it pushes
the consumer arbitrarily close to the self-imposed liquidity constraint).
F Endogenous Gridpoints Solution Method
The model is solved using an extension of the method of endogenous gridpoints
(Carroll (2006)): A grid of possible values of end-of-period assets   a is deﬁned (aVec
in the software), and at these points, marginal end-of-period-t value is computed
52as the discounted next-period expected marginal utility of consumption (which the
Envelope theorem says matches expected marginal value). The results are then used
to identify the corresponding levels of consumption at the beginning of the period:
42
u
 (ct(  a)) = Rβ Et[u
 (Γt+1ct+1(Rt+1  a + ξt+1))] (97)
  ct ≡ ct(  a)=
 
Rβ Et
 
(Γt+1ct+1(Rt+1  a + ξt+1))
−ρ  −1/ρ
.
The dynamic budget constraint can then be used to generate the corresponding
m’s:
  mt =   a +  ct.
An approximation to the consumption function could be constructed by linear
interpolation between the {  m,  c} points. But a vastly more accurate approximation
can be made (for a given number of gridpoints) if the interpolation is constructed
so that it also matches the marginal propensity to consume at the gridpoints.
Diﬀerentiating (97) with respect to a (and dropping policy function arguments for
simplicity) yields a marginal propensity to have consumed ca at each gridpoint:
u
  (ct)c
a
t = Rβ Et[u
  (Γt+1ct+1)Γt+1c
m
t+1Rt+1]
= Rβ Et[u
  (Γt+1ct+1)Rc
m
t+1]
c
a
t = Rβ Et[u
  (Γt+1ct+1)Rc
m
t+1]/u
  (ct) (98)
and the marginal propensity to consume at the beginning of the period is obtained
from the marginal propensity to have consumed by noting that, if we deﬁne m(a)=
c(a) − a,
c = m − a
c
a +1 = m
a
which, together with the chain rule ca =c mma, yields the MPC from
c
m(c
a +1 ) = c
a
c
m = c
a/(1 + c
a)
and we call the vector of MPC’s at the   mt gridpoints   κt.
G The Terminal/Limiting Consumption Function
For any set of parameter values that satisfy the conditions required for convergence,
the problem can be solved by setting the terminal consumption function to cT(m)=
42The software can also solve a version of the model with explicit liquidity constraints, where the Envelope
condition does not hold.
53m and constructing {cT−1,cT−2,...} by time iteration (a method that will converge
to c(m) by standard theorems). But cT(m)=m is very far from the ﬁnal converged
consumption rule c(m),
43 so many periods of iteration will likely be required to
obtain a candidate rule that even remotely resembles the converged function.
A natural alternative choice for the terminal consumption rule is the solution
to the perfect foresight liquidity constrained problem, to which the model’s solu-
tion converges (under speciﬁed parametric restrictions) as all forms of uncertainty
approach zero (as discussed in the main text). But a diﬃculty with this idea is
that the perfect foresight liquidity constrained solution is ‘kinked:’ The slope of
the consumption function changes discretely at the points {m1
#,m 2
#,...}.T h i s i s
a practical problem because it rules out the use of derivatives of the consumption
function in its approximation, thereby preventing the enormous increase in eﬃciency
obtainable from a higher-order approximation.
Our solution is simple: The formulae in appendix A that identify kink points on
˚ c(m) for integer values of n (e.g., cn
# = Þ Þ Þ
−n
Γ ) are continuous functions of n;t h e
conclusion that ˚ c(m) is piecewise linear between the kink points does not require
that the terminal consumption rule (from which time iteration proceeds) also be
piecewise linear. Thus, for values n ≥ 0 we can construct a smooth function ˘ c(m)
that matches the true perfect foresight liquidity constrained consumption function
at the set of points corresponding to integer periods in the future, but satisﬁes the
(continuous, and greater at non-kink points) consumption rule deﬁned from the
appendix’s formulas by noninteger values of n at other points.
44
This strategy generates a smooth limiting consumption function – except at the
remaining kink point deﬁned by {m0
#,c 0
#}. Below this point, the solution must
match c(m)=m because the constraint is binding. At m = m0
# the MPC discretely
drops (that is, limm↑m0
# c (m)=1while limm↓m0
# c (m)=κ0
# < 1).
Such a kink point causes substantial problems for numerical solution methods
(like the one we use, described below) that rely upon the smoothness of the limiting
consumption function.
Our solution is to use, as the terminal consumption rule, a function that is
identical to the (smooth) continuous consumption rule ˘ c(m) above some n ≥ n,
but to replace ˘ c(m) between m0
# and m
n
# with the unique polynomial function ˆ c(m)
that satisﬁes the following criteria:
1. ˆ c(m0
#)=c0
#
2. ˆ c (m0
#)=1
3. ˆ c (m
n
#)=( dcn
#/dn)(dmn
#/dn)−1|n=n
43Unless β ≈ +0.
44In practice, we calculate the ﬁrst and second derivatives of ˚ c and use piecewise polynomial approximation
methods that match the function at these points.
544. ˆ c  (m
n
#)=( d2cn
#/dn2)(d2mn
#/dn2)−1|n=n
where n is chosen judgmentally in a way calculated to generate a good compromise
between smoothness of the limiting consumption function ˘ c(m) and ﬁdelity of that
function to the˚ c(m) (see the actual code for details).
We thus deﬁne the terminal function as
45
cT(m)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
0 <m≤ m0
# m
m0
# <m<m
n
# ˘ c(m)
m
n
# <m ˚ c(m)
(99)
Since the precautionary saving motive implies that in the presence of uncertainty
the optimal level of consumption exceeds the level that is optimal without uncer-
tainty, and since ˘ c(m) ≥˚ c(m), implicitly deﬁning m = eμ (so that μ =l o gm), we
can construct
χt(μ)=l o g ( 1 − ct(e
μ)/cT(e
μ)) (100)
which must be a number between −∞ and +∞ (since 0 < ct(m) < ˘ c(m) for m>0).
This function turns out to be much better behaved (as a numerical observation; no
formal proof is oﬀered) than the level of the optimal consumption rule ct(m).I n
particular, χt(μ) is well approximated by linear functions both as m ↓ 0 and as
m ↑∞ .
Diﬀerentiating with respect to μ and dropping consumption function arguments
yields
χ
 
t(μ)=
⎛
⎝
−
 
c 
tcT−ctc 
T
c2
T eμ
 
1 − ct/cT
⎞
⎠ (101)
which can be solved for
c
 
t =( c tc
 
T/cT) − ((cT − ct)/m)χ
 
t. (102)
Similarly, we can solve (100) for
ct(m)=
 
1 − e
χt(logm) 
cT(m). (103)
Thus, having approximated χt, we can recover from it the level and derivative(s)
of ct.
46
45For further details see the archive ﬁle ./CoreCode/Documentation/cTerminal.nb.
46See ./CoreCode/Documentation/Derivations.nb for implementation details and further derivations.
55Table 4 Taxonomy of Liquidity Constrained Model Outcomes
Name Condition Outcome/Comments
  PF-GIC 1 < Þ Þ Þ/Γ Constraint never binds for m ≥ 1
RIC Þ Þ Þ/R < 1 FHWC holds (R > Γ)
˚ c(m)=¯ c(m) for m ≥ 1
  RIC 1 < Þ Þ Þ/R ˚ c(m) is degenerate
PF-GIC Þ Þ Þ/Γ < 1 Constraint binds in ﬁnite time for any m
RIC Þ Þ Þ/R < 1 FHWC may or may not hold
limm↑∞¯ c(m) −˚ c(m)=0
limm↑∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=κ
  RIC 1 < Þ Þ Þ/R  FHWC
limm↑∞˚ κ κ κ(m)=0
Conditions are applied from left to right; for example, the second and third rows indicate conclusions in the
case where   PF-GIC and RIC both hold, while the fourth row indicates that when the PF-GIC and the RIC
both fail, the consumption function is degenerate; the next row indicates that whenever the PF-GIC holds, the
constraint will bind in ﬁnite time.
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